---
id: CVE-2026-52846
title: 'Caddy: stripHTML template function bypass'
summary: 'Caddy: stripHTML template function bypass'
severity: medium
cvss: 4.2
cwe:
  - CWE-116
vendor: caddyserver
product: github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2
ecosystem: go
affected:
  - github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2 <= 2.11.3
  - github.com/caddyserver/caddy <= 1.0.5
patched:
  - github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2 2.11.4
published: '2026-06-16'
updated: '2026-06-16'
source: GHSA
sourceUrl: 'https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-vcc4-2c75-vc9v'
references:
  - url: >-
      https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy/security/advisories/GHSA-vcc4-2c75-vc9v
  - url: 'https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-vcc4-2c75-vc9v'
tags:
  - ghsa
  - go
epss: 0.00189
epssPercentile: 0.08741
ingestedAt: '2026-06-29T14:31:47.680Z'
---

## Overview

### Summary
Caddy’s `stripHTML` template function cannot reliably remove all HTML tags from input strings. Certain malformed HTML, such as `<<>img src=x onerror=alert()>`, can bypass the tag-stripping logic, potentially leaving dangerous content in the output if it is later rendered as HTML. This may allow client-side XSS in cases where untrusted strings are rendered unsafely.

---

### Details
The vulnerability originates from `funcStripHTML` in:

[caddy/caddy/caddyhttp/templates/tplcontext.go](https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy/blob/77e9ce7404c4a76853e101a9f5687a929ee56654/modules/caddyhttp/templates/tplcontext.go)

```go
func (TemplateContext) funcStripHTML(s string) string {
    var buf bytes.Buffer
    var inTag, inQuotes bool
    var tagStart int
    for i, ch := range s {
        if inTag {
            if ch == '>' && !inQuotes {
                inTag = false
            } else if ch == '<' && !inQuotes {
                // false start
                buf.WriteString(s[tagStart:i])
                tagStart = i
            } else if ch == '"' {
                inQuotes = !inQuotes
            }
            continue
        }
        if ch == '<' {
            inTag = true
            tagStart = i
            continue
        }
        buf.WriteRune(ch)
    }
    if inTag {
        // false start
        buf.WriteString(s[tagStart:])
    }
    return buf.String()
}
```

### POC

Caddyfile setup

```
:8080 {
    root * ./site
    file_server
    templates
}
```

Template file (index.html)

```html
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html lang="en">
<head>
    <meta charset="UTF-8">
    <title>StripHTML Bypass Test</title>
</head>
<body>
    <p>{{ stripHTML "<<>img src=x onerror=alert('XSS')>" }}</p>
</body>
</html>
```

The payload exploits the false start branch to smuggle a literal < back into the output, then uses the following > to terminate the parser’s tag state, leaving a valid <img ...> tag behind.

Tested in v2.11.3

### Impact

Malformed HTML can bypass stripHTML, potentially allowing arbitrary HTML or JavaScript to be rendered if the output is used unsafely, leading to client-side XSS.

### AI Disclosure

AI assisted in writing the report description; however, the discovery of the issue has been done manually.

## Affected packages

- `github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2 <= 2.11.3`
- `github.com/caddyserver/caddy <= 1.0.5`

## Remediation

Upgrade to a patched release:

- `github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2 2.11.4`
