---
id: CVE-2026-50279
title: >-
  Craft CMS: Authorship spoofing in `entries/save-entry` via
  pre-check/post-mutation authorization gap
summary: >-
  Craft CMS: Authorship spoofing in `entries/save-entry` via
  pre-check/post-mutation authorization gap
severity: high
cwe:
  - CWE-285
vendor: craftcms
product: craftcms/cms
ecosystem: composer
affected:
  - 'craftcms/cms >= 5.0.0-RC1, < 5.9.21'
patched:
  - craftcms/cms 5.9.21
published: '2026-07-02'
updated: '2026-07-02'
source: GHSA
sourceUrl: 'https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-qq2c-2q8j-jh27'
references:
  - url: 'https://github.com/craftcms/cms/security/advisories/GHSA-qq2c-2q8j-jh27'
  - url: 'https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-50279'
  - url: >-
      https://github.com/craftcms/cms/commit/9cc493be8b414d7116c7f2bc2a6d0926e73f1248
  - url: 'https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-qq2c-2q8j-jh27'
tags:
  - ghsa
  - composer
epss: 0.00364
epssPercentile: 0.27587
ingestedAt: '2026-07-02T19:41:50.970Z'
---

## Overview

### Summary

`EntriesController::actionSaveEntry()` performs entry-edit permission checks before request-controlled author changes are applied to the model. The subsequent author mutation path accepts attacker-supplied `authors` / `author` parameters and allows the change when the current user is one of the old authors. Because the controller does not re-run authorization after mutating the author list, a low-privileged user can reassign an entry’s authorship to another user without holding the dedicated peer-author-change permission.

### Details
The control flow begins in [EntriesController.php](/D:/files/projects/cms-5.9.19/cms-5.9.19/src/controllers/EntriesController.php):249. `actionSaveEntry()` loads the entry and enforces edit permissions before calling `_populateEntryModel()`:

```php
public function actionSaveEntry(bool $duplicate = false): ?Response
{
    ...
    $entry = $this->_editableEntry($this->request->getBodyParam('entryId'), $siteId);
    ...
    $this->enforceEditEntryPermissions($entry, $duplicate);
    ...
    $this->_populateEntryModel($entry);
    ...
    $success = Craft::$app->getElements()->saveElement($entry);
}
```

The attacker-controlled source is in [EntriesController.php](/D:/files/projects/cms-5.9.19/cms-5.9.19/src/controllers/EntriesController.php):588:

```php
$entry->setAttributesFromRequest(array_filter([
    'authorIds' => $this->request->getBodyParam('authors') ??
        $this->request->getBodyParam('author') ??
        $entry->getAuthorId() ??
        static::currentUser()->id,
]));
```

`Entry::setAttributesFromRequest()` in [Entry.php](/D:/files/projects/cms-5.9.19/cms-5.9.19/src/elements/Entry.php):1124 extracts the new author IDs and applies them if `canChangeAuthor()` returns true:

```php
if (
    ($authorIds !== null || $authorId !== null) &&
    $this->canChangeAuthor()
) {
    $this->_oldAuthorIds = $oldAuthorIds;
    $this->setAuthorIds($authorIds);
}
```

`canChangeAuthor()` at [Entry.php](/D:/files/projects/cms-5.9.19/cms-5.9.19/src/elements/Entry.php):2789 allows the author change when the current user can view peer entries and is already one of the existing authors:

```php
return (
    empty($authorIds) ||
    in_array($user->id, $authorIds) ||
    $user->can("changeAuthorForPeerEntries:$section->uid")
);
```

After the author list is mutated, the controller does not re-check authorization. 

This closes the exploit chain:

1. External source: authenticated request to `entries/save-entry` with attacker-controlled `authors[]`.
2. Trust boundary failure: authorization is checked on the pre-mutation entry state, not on the post-mutation author assignment.
3. Privileged sink: the author relationship is rewritten in persistent storage.

Preconditions derived from the source:

1. The attacker is authenticated and can edit entry `345`.
2. The attacker is among the existing authors of entry `345`, or otherwise satisfies `canChangeAuthor()` through the old author set.
3. The attacker has `viewPeerEntries` for the section.
4. User ID `1` exists and can be assigned as an author in that section.

Result:

1. `enforceEditEntryPermissions()` succeeds on the original entry state.
2. `_populateEntryModel()` reads `authors[]=1` from the request body.
3. `setAttributesFromRequest()` updates `authorIds` because `canChangeAuthor()` is evaluated against the old authorship state.
4. `saveElement()` persists the change and `_saveAuthors()` rewrites the entry-author relation.
5. Entry `345` now appears authored by user `1`.

### Impact

This allows low-privileged users to falsify content ownership and alter the authorship of entries without having the dedicated author-management permission. The impact includes corrupted audit trails, misleading notifications, broken approval workflows, and unauthorized reassignment of content responsibility.

## Affected packages

- `craftcms/cms >= 5.0.0-RC1, < 5.9.21`

## Remediation

Upgrade to a patched release:

- `craftcms/cms 5.9.21`
