---
id: CVE-2026-48086
title: >-
  OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted
  appointment booking platform
summary: >-
  OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted
  appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.2, a TENANT_ADMIN promotes
  themselves to platform-wide GLOBAL_ADMIN through a single PUT request. The
  role-u…
severity: critical
cvss: 9.9
cvssVector: 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H'
cwe:
  - CWE-269
published: '2026-08-06'
updated: '2026-09-08'
sourceUpdated: '2026-09-08T20:51:43.490'
source: NVD
sourceUrl: 'https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48086'
references:
  - url: >-
      https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/commit/8525d35a41c31078d9f01c62e9687e653cf1a494
    label: security-advisories@github.com
  - url: >-
      https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/security/advisories/GHSA-5qfr-7q4g-3469
    label: security-advisories@github.com
  - url: >-
      https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/security/advisories/GHSA-5qfr-7q4g-3469
    label: 134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0
tags:
  - nvd
epss: 0.00442
epssPercentile: 0.35717
ingestedAt: '2026-09-08T21:11:12.270Z'
---

## Overview

OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.2, a TENANT_ADMIN promotes themselves to platform-wide GLOBAL_ADMIN through a single PUT request. The role-update handler accepts the `GLOBAL_ADMIN` enum value from any tenant admin updating their own tenant's staff. No policy check enforces that "only an existing GLOBAL_ADMIN may grant GLOBAL_ADMIN", so the schema validation IS the authorization decision. After re-login, the JWT contains the new role and the formerly-tenant-scoped admin reaches every other tenant on the platform. On the hosted OpenReception service this is a scope-changed escalation: a single customer-side tenant administrator gains full platform-wide administrative control over all other tenants' configuration, users, staff records, operational metadata, and tenant lifecycle. Plaintext appointment contents remain subject to the E2E model unless chained with the staff-crypto poisoning issue (V-4) or with staff-passkey hijacking (V-1). On a single-tenant self-hosted deployment it is still a privilege escalation because TENANT_ADMIN should not be able to create new tenants, modify global configuration, or manage other administrators. The same handler also accepts updates targeted at any colleague within the tenant. A tenant admin can promote a separate collaborator account instead of themselves, leaving their own audit trail clean while the platform-wide breach happens through a separate identity. Version 1.0.2 fixes the issue.

## Remediation

Refer to the linked advisories for vendor-supplied fixes and affected version ranges.