---
id: CVE-2026-48075
title: >-
  OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted
  appointment booking platform
summary: >-
  OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted
  appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.5, the `add-to-tunnel`
  endpoint creates a new appointment row in any client tunnel without any caller
  authen…
severity: medium
cvss: 6.5
cvssVector: 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L'
cwe:
  - CWE-862
published: '2026-08-06'
updated: '2026-09-08'
sourceUpdated: '2026-09-08T20:51:43.490'
source: NVD
sourceUrl: 'https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48075'
references:
  - url: >-
      https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/commit/4522a44c001782848faff5529d7c1e2be7ac9ef5
    label: security-advisories@github.com
  - url: >-
      https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/security/advisories/GHSA-rhp5-vmcx-4qm8
    label: security-advisories@github.com
  - url: >-
      https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/security/advisories/GHSA-rhp5-vmcx-4qm8
    label: 134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0
tags:
  - nvd
epss: 0.00391
epssPercentile: 0.33112
ingestedAt: '2026-09-08T21:11:12.270Z'
---

## Overview

OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.5, the `add-to-tunnel` endpoint creates a new appointment row in any client tunnel without any caller authentication. A request that supplies any valid `tunnelId` and any valid `emailHash` (the two need not belong to the same tunnel) results in an inserted appointment with `status = "CONFIRMED"`, attacker-controlled ciphertext fields, attacker-controlled date and duration, and an attacker-chosen agent. The endpoint validates only that some tunnel exists with the given `emailHash`, then writes the appointment using the attacker-supplied `tunnelId` directly. The `emailHash` lookup is effectively an existence check on the tenant; it does not authenticate the caller as the owner of the supplied `tunnelId`. Combined with the absence of any session, Authorization header, booking access token, or PoW, this makes the endpoint accept arbitrary appointment writes into arbitrary tunnels. By contrast, the sibling endpoint `create-new-client` (used to bootstrap a brand-new client tunnel) requires a Bearer bootstrap booking access token issued by the bootstrap-challenge / bootstrap-verify flow. The `add-to-tunnel` endpoint, intended for return-clients booking additional appointments, has no equivalent gate. The application's own middleware confirms this is intentional: `add-to-tunnel` is explicitly listed in the apiAuthHandle public-route allowlist alongside the bootstrap and challenge endpoints (which legitimately have no session). Version 1.0.5 fixes the issue.

## Remediation

Refer to the linked advisories for vendor-supplied fixes and affected version ranges.