MantisBT: SQL Injection via history_order Configuration Value

Overview

MantisBT 2.28.3 and earlier versions contains a SQL injection vulnerability in core/history_api.php. The history_order configuration value is concatenated directly into a SQL ORDER BY clause without any sanitisation, parameterization, or validation against a whitelist.

An administrator can set this configuration value via the web UI (adm_config_set.php) or the REST API (PATCH /api/rest/config). The injected SQL then executes whenever any user views a bug with history entries.

Impact

• Sensitive data extraction from the entire bugtracker database including user credentials (cookie_string, password hashes), API tokens, and private issue data
• With MySQL FILE privilege: full RCE via INTO OUTFILE writing a PHP webshell to the web root
• The admin plants the payload once; any authenticated user viewing a bug with history triggers the injection

Patches

• https://github.com/mantisbt/mantisbt/commit/6ad20bea2e01f33c6e4170775ae4d9dbe2c75325

Workarounds

Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?

Resources

• https://mantisbt.org/bugs/view.php?id=37123

Credits

McCaulay Hudson (@McCaulay) of watchTowr

Affected packages

• mantisbt/mantisbt <= 2.28.3

Remediation

Upgrade to a patched release:

• mantisbt/mantisbt 2.28.4