---
id: CVE-2026-43910
aliases:
  - GHSA-28f5-38xr-jh2w
title: >-
  java-client Allows Network Pivot via Unvalidated directConnect Redirect in
  AppiumCommandExecutor
summary: >-
  java-client Allows Network Pivot via Unvalidated directConnect Redirect in
  AppiumCommandExecutor
severity: high
cvss: 8.2
cwe:
  - CWE-441
  - CWE-918
vendor: appium
product: 'io.appium:java-client'
ecosystem: maven
affected:
  - 'io.appium:java-client >= 8.2.1, <= 10.1.0'
patched:
  - 'io.appium:java-client 10.1.1'
published: '2026-07-28'
updated: '2026-07-28'
source: GHSA
sourceUrl: 'https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-28f5-38xr-jh2w'
references:
  - url: >-
      https://github.com/appium/java-client/security/advisories/GHSA-28f5-38xr-jh2w
  - url: 'https://github.com/appium/java-client/pull/2408'
  - url: >-
      https://github.com/appium/java-client/commit/2b9cd442b9dbf56ccc6f1e83aeeb411c0ec230c9
  - url: 'https://github.com/appium/java-client/releases/tag/v10.1.1'
  - url: 'https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-28f5-38xr-jh2w'
tags:
  - ghsa
  - maven
ingestedAt: '2026-07-28T14:36:39.120Z'
epss: 0.0043
epssPercentile: 0.34468
---

## Overview

## Summary

When `directConnect(true)` is enabled, appium/java-client unconditionally
accepts `directConnectHost`, `directConnectPort`, and `directConnectPath`
from the server's NEW_SESSION response and silently redirects all subsequent
session traffic to the attacker-specified endpoint — with no allowlist,
no host validation, and no user notification.

## Affected Code

- `AppiumCommandExecutor.java` (line 196–219): `setDirectConnect()` builds
  a new URL from server-supplied fields and calls `overrideServerUrl(newUrl)`
  without validating host/IP.
- `DirectConnect.java`: `getUrl()` constructs `protocol://host:port/path`
  with no allowlist.

## Root Cause

Only the protocol is validated (must equal "https"). The destination host
and port are never checked against any allowlist or denylist.

## PoC (confirmed)

A rogue server injecting `directConnectHost=127.0.0.1:4443` causes the
client to silently redirect all post-session commands:

[bootstrap]       POST /wd/hub/session
[bootstrap]       Injecting directConnect -> https://127.0.0.1:4443/wd/hub
[redirect-target] HIT #1: GET /wd/hub/session/poc-session-001/source
[redirect-target] HIT #2: DELETE /wd/hub/session/poc-session-001

Original source code unmodified — confirmed via `git diff HEAD` (empty).

## Evidence Screenshots

**Screenshot 1 — Rogue server capturing redirected traffic:**

<img width="887" height="146" alt="1" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/cc28002c-ea20-4ac8-8336-cec632e3c842" />

**Screenshot 2 — Java client processing response from attacker host:**

<img width="788" height="130" alt="2" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/222cbab0-0d53-45b2-847d-6aa4e3b79370" />

## Impact

- Full interception of session traffic
- Network pivot to internal hosts (RFC-1918, 169.254.169.254)
- Cloud credential theft via IMDS endpoint
- Escalates to ~8.1 High in CI/CD environments where directConnect(true)
  is set in shared base configuration

## Suggested Fix

Add allowlist validation before `overrideServerUrl()` is called, and/or
block RFC-1918/loopback/link-local destinations by default.

[poc_appium_directconnect.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/26472525/poc_appium_directconnect.zip)

## Affected packages

- `io.appium:java-client >= 8.2.1, <= 10.1.0`

## Remediation

Upgrade to a patched release:

- `io.appium:java-client 10.1.1`