CVE-2026-40256Medium· 5.0▾ SunlitWeblate: Prefix-Based Repository Boundary Check Bypass via Symlink/Junction Path Prefix Collision
▾ Sunlit zone — Low / medium · no exploitation signal
impact 27.5 · likelihood 0.1 · exploitation 0
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Exploit-prediction probability, daily snapshots since Jul 13.
Disclosure to exploitation, from the record and what we observed since indexing it.
Disclosed via OSV
Last analysed / modified upstream
0.3%
Weblate repository-boundary validation relies on string prefix checks on resolved absolute paths. In multiple code paths, the check uses startswith against the repository root path. This is not path-segment aware and can be bypassed when the external path shares the same string prefix as the repository path (for example, repo and repo_outside).
Thanks to m9nx4u for reporting this issue via HackerOne.
weblate < 5.17Upgrade to a patched release:
weblate 5.17Connected by shared product, vendor, weakness, or advisory.
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