---
id: CVE-2026-22870
aliases:
  - GHSA-ffj4-jq7m-9g6v
  - PYSEC-2026-1429
title: GuardDog Zip Bomb Vulnerability in safe_extract() Allows DoS
summary: GuardDog Zip Bomb Vulnerability in safe_extract() Allows DoS
severity: high
vendor: guarddog
product: guarddog
ecosystem: pip
affected:
  - guarddog < 2.7.1
patched:
  - guarddog 2.7.1
published: '2026-01-13'
updated: '2026-07-07'
source: OSV
sourceUrl: 'https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-ffj4-jq7m-9g6v'
references:
  - url: >-
      https://github.com/DataDog/guarddog/security/advisories/GHSA-ffj4-jq7m-9g6v
  - url: 'https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22870'
  - url: >-
      https://github.com/DataDog/guarddog/commit/c3fb07b4838945f42497e78b7a02bcfb1e63969b
  - url: 'https://github.com/DataDog/guarddog'
tags:
  - osv
  - pip
epss: 0.00519
epssPercentile: 0.41557
ingestedAt: '2026-07-08T18:25:48.877Z'
---

## Overview

## Summary

GuardDog's `safe_extract()` function does not validate decompressed file sizes when extracting ZIP archives (wheels, eggs), allowing attackers to cause denial of service through zip bombs. A malicious package can consume gigabytes of disk space from a few megabytes of compressed data.

## Vulnerability Details

**Affected Component:** `guarddog/utils/archives.py` - `safe_extract()` function  
**Vulnerability Type:** CWE-409 - Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Zip Bomb)  
**Severity:** HIGH (CVSS ~8)  
**Attack Vector:** Network (malicious package uploaded to PyPI/npm) or local

### Root Cause

The `safe_extract()` function handles TAR files securely using the `tarsafe` library, but ZIP file extraction has no size validation:
```python
elif zipfile.is_zipfile(source_archive):
    with zipfile.ZipFile(source_archive, "r") as zip:
        for file in zip.namelist():
            zip.extract(file, path=os.path.join(target_directory, file))
```

**Missing protections:**
- ❌ No decompressed size limit
- ❌ No compression ratio validation  
- ❌ No file count limits
- ❌ No total extracted size validation

## Impact

### Denial of Service Scenarios

**1. CI/CD Pipeline Disruption**
- Attacker publishes malicious package to PyPI
- Developer adds package to requirements.txt
- CI/CD runs GuardDog scan
- Disk fills (GitHub Actions: standard 14GB limit)
- All deployments blocked

**2. Resource Exhaustion**
- Local development environments
- Security scanning infrastructure  
- Automated scanning systems
- Docker containers with limited disk

**3. Supply Chain Attack Amplification**
- Single malicious package blocks security scanning
- Prevents detection of other malicious packages
- Forces manual intervention
- Increases security team workload

## Recommended Fix

Add size validation for ZIP files similar to what `tarsafe` provides for TAR files

### Configuration Options

Make limits configurable via environment variables or config file

## Additional Improvements

1. **Add warning logs** when archives approach limits
2. **Provide clear error messages** for users
3. **Document limits** in user-facing documentation
4. **Add tests** for zip bomb detection
5. **Consider using a safe ZIP library** (similar to tarsafe)

## Credit

Reported by: Charbel (dwbruijn)

## Affected packages

- `guarddog < 2.7.1`

## Remediation

Upgrade to a patched release:

- `guarddog 2.7.1`