CVE-2026-21871Medium· 6.1▾ SunlitNiceGUI is vulnerable to XSS via Unescaped URL in ui.navigate.history.push() / replace()
▾ Sunlit zone — Low / medium · no exploitation signal
impact 33.6 · likelihood 0.1 · exploitation 0
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Exploit-prediction probability, daily snapshots since Jul 8.
Disclosure to exploitation, from the record and what we observed since indexing it.
Disclosed via OSV
Last analysed / modified upstream
0.2%
0.2% → 0.3%
XSS risk exists in NiceGUI when developers pass attacker-controlled strings into ui.navigate.history.push() or ui.navigate.history.replace(). These helpers are documented as History API wrappers for updating the browser URL without page reload. However, if the URL argument is embedded into generated JavaScript without proper escaping, a crafted payload can break out of the intended string context and execute arbitrary JavaScript in the victim’s browser.
Applications that do not pass untrusted input into ui.navigate.history.push/replace are not affected.
NiceGUI provides ui.navigate.history.push(url) and ui.navigate.history.replace(url) to update the URL using the browser History API. If an application forwards user-controlled data (e.g., URL path segments, query parameters like next=..., form values, etc.) into these methods, an attacker can inject characters such as quotes and statement terminators to escape the JavaScript string context and execute arbitrary code.
A vulnerable pattern is:
ui.navigate.history.push(payload) (or replace).This is similar in spirit to other NiceGUI XSS advisories:
ui.html(),ui.chat_message() can cause XSS when developers render untrusted input as HTML (XSS risk/footgun).ui.interactive_image had XSS via unsanitized SVG content and was handled as a security advisory with a fix and severity rating.Because ui.navigate.history.* is expected to accept a URL (data) rather than executable code, the library should escape/encode the argument before emitting JavaScript.
from nicegui import ui
@ui.page('/')
def index():
# A link/button a victim could click (attacker can also send the URL directly)
ui.button('open crafted path', on_click=lambda: ui.navigate.to('/%22);alert(document.domain);//'))
@ui.page('/{payload:path}')
def victim(payload: str):
ui.label(f'payload = {payload!r}')
# Vulnerable use: forwarding attacker-controlled path to history.push
ui.button('trigger', on_click=lambda: ui.navigate.history.push(payload))
ui.run()
python app.py
http://localhost:8080/open crafted pathtriggerExpected result: JavaScript executes (an alert showing document.domain).
ui.navigate.history.push/replaceui.navigate.history.push() or ui.navigate.history.replace()nicegui >= 2.13.0, < 3.5.0Upgrade to a patched release:
nicegui 3.5.0Connected by shared product, vendor, weakness, or advisory.
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