---
id: CVE-2026-12047
title: HTML injection in pgAdmin 4's cloud deployment module
summary: >-
  HTML injection in pgAdmin 4's cloud deployment module. The verify_credentials,
  deploy, regions, and update-server endpoints under /rds/, /azure/, /google/,
  and the top-level /cloud/ blueprint propagated AWS / Azure / Google SDK
  exception…
severity: low
cvss: 3.5
cvssVector: 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N'
cwe:
  - CWE-79
  - CWE-116
  - CWE-79
vendor: pgadmin
product: pgadmin_4
affected:
  - 'pgadmin_4 >= 6.6, < 9.16'
patched:
  - pgadmin_4 9.16
published: '2026-06-19'
updated: '2026-06-29'
source: NVD
sourceUrl: 'https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-12047'
references:
  - url: >-
      https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/60d149864b5fdd99675754c7996637737a24fce3
    label: f86ef6dc-4d3a-42ad-8f28-e6d5547a5007
  - url: 'https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/issues/10069'
    label: f86ef6dc-4d3a-42ad-8f28-e6d5547a5007
tags:
  - nvd
epss: 0.00221
epssPercentile: 0.11283
ingestedAt: '2026-06-29T15:48:27.680Z'
---

## Overview

HTML injection in pgAdmin 4's cloud deployment module. The verify_credentials, deploy, regions, and update-server endpoints under /rds/, /azure/, /google/, and the top-level /cloud/ blueprint propagated AWS / Azure / Google SDK exception text — and the related file-resolution and database-commit exception text — into the JSON response body (the info and errormsg fields) without HTML-encoding. The Cloud Wizard frontend rendered these strings through html-react-parser, so an attacker-influenced exception message embedded structural HTML directly into the wizard's DOM.

The reported entry point is /rds/verify_credentials/. An authenticated pgAdmin user submits a crafted access_key whose value contains an <iframe/src=...> payload; AWS STS rejects the credential with an IncompleteSignature exception whose text quotes the access_key verbatim; the pgAdmin backend forwards that text into the JSON info field; the Cloud Wizard's FormFooterMessage parses it as HTML. The browser fetches the iframe's src from an attacker-controlled host, and JavaScript executing inside the cross-origin iframe writes to parent.location, redirecting the victim's pgAdmin tab. Because the injection renders inside pgAdmin's own interface, X-Frame-Options and Content-Security-Policy frame-ancestors do not mitigate it. Baseline impact is self-targeted (the same user who supplied the payload sees the injection); escalation against other authenticated users requires an additional cross-site request-forgery primitive capable of submitting the malformed credential request with a valid X-pgA-CSRFToken in the victim's browser context.

The same unsanitised-error-into-JSON pattern was present across multiple sibling endpoints — Azure's check_cluster_name_availability, every Google endpoint that surfaces SDK errors (verification_ack, projects, regions, instance_types, database_versions, the verify_credentials path-resolution branches), the central /deploy endpoint that bubbles str(e) from deploy_on_rds / deploy_on_azure / deploy_on_google, and update_cloud_server which surfaces the str(e) from a failing db.session.commit — all of which are now covered.

Fix HTML-escapes every external/SDK exception string at the endpoint sink via a new shared sanitize_external_text helper (HTML escape with control-character strip), promoted out of the psycopg3 driver into web/pgadmin/utils/text_sanitize.py. The Cloud Wizard frontend additionally renders its FormFooterMessage in plain-text mode for backend-derived strings, so the value is never parsed as HTML even if a future sink forgets the escape.

This issue affects pgAdmin 4: from 6.6 before 9.16.

## Affected

- `pgadmin_4 >= 6.6, < 9.16`

## Remediation

Upgrade past the affected range:

- `pgadmin_4 9.16`