---
id: CVE-2026-115477
aliases:
  - GHSA-737x-cwfr-5vvc
title: >-
  obsidian-tc: Declined human-in-the-loop confirmations can permit destructive
  calls over HTTP
summary: >-
  obsidian-tc: Declined human-in-the-loop confirmations can permit destructive
  calls over HTTP
severity: high
cvss: 7.1
cwe:
  - CWE-285
  - CWE-863
vendor: obsidian-tc
product: obsidian-tc
ecosystem: npm
affected:
  - 'obsidian-tc >= 1.13.0, <= 1.31.3'
patched:
  - obsidian-tc 1.31.4
published: '2026-10-23'
updated: '2026-10-23'
sourceUpdated: '2026-10-23T17:30:11Z'
source: GHSA
sourceUrl: 'https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-737x-cwfr-5vvc'
references:
  - url: >-
      https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/security/advisories/GHSA-737x-cwfr-5vvc
  - url: 'https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/issues/967'
  - url: 'https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/pull/969'
  - url: >-
      https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/commit/101c91c656e2c2b88bcf3696a5da035f8c032c71
  - url: 'https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/blob/v1.31.4/CHANGELOG.md'
  - url: 'https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/releases/tag/v1.31.4'
  - url: 'https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2026-115477'
  - url: 'https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-737x-cwfr-5vvc'
tags:
  - ghsa
  - npm
  - cve.org
cvssVector: 'CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N'
cvssSource: cna
ingestedAt: '2026-10-23T14:28:08.697Z'
---

## Overview

### Summary
On a Streamable HTTP deployment with `auth.jwtSecret` configured, serving a 2026-07-28-era client that declared `elicitation.form` support, a call to a dispatch-gated tool (`destructive: true`, or a scope with an HITL floor) that was offered an `inputRequired` confirmation could still complete after the human declined, cancelled, or the elicitation response was omitted or malformed, provided the client echoed the validly bound `requestState` on resubmission. The server trusted an authentic, call-bound state as proof of approval; the state is minted before the elicitation leg is asked, so it proves only that the resubmission belongs to the same call.

### Details
Reproduced directly: a `destructive: true` tool call, offered `inputRequired`, answered with `{action: "decline"}` on the `elicitation/create` leg, still wrote. Present since the 2026-07-28 round trip shipped in v1.13.0 (THE-583). Only dispatch-gated tools were reachable; the sixteen handler-side conditionally gated tools (`write_note` overwrite, `move_note`, and others) did not read the elicitation state on the modern wire at all, so they neither let a decline nor an approval through.

### Impact
A client that echoes state after a decline can execute destructive vault operations (delete, cross-folder move, frontmatter replace, link rewrite) that the human explicitly refused. The precondition is a compliant client behaving incorrectly or a client under an attacker's control; the human's refusal is not enforced by the server.

### Patches
Fixed in 1.31.4: the server now also requires the confirm leg's own response (`inputResponse`) to be `{action: "accept", content: {approve: true}}` before trusting the echoed state. A declined, cancelled or not-approved round renders the ordinary `elicit_required` error and is never offered a second round for the same declined confirmation. The same release adds server-initiated in-band confirmation on stdio (legacy era), so stdio agents no longer need to mint `elicit_token` themselves.

### Not addressed
A malicious or non-compliant client can still answer its own `elicitation/create` leg with an approval regardless of what the human said. The server cannot verify that the client rendered the form or that a human saw it; this is inherent to the client-driven half of the 2026-07-28 protocol. The legacy shim, where the server sends and owns the leg, does not share this gap.

### Workarounds
Run affected deployments over stdio, or leave `auth.jwtSecret` unset so the `requestState` codec (and therefore `inputRequired`) is never offered; both fall back to the CLI `elicit_token` path.

### Credit
Reported in GH #967; found and closed under THE-1106 (PR #969); the residual is documented in SECURITY.md.

### References
- PR #969, GH #967, CHANGELOG `## [1.31.4] ### Security`
- `packages/server/src/mcp/server.ts` (`tools/call` handler), `packages/server/src/vault/hitl.ts`

## Affected packages

- `obsidian-tc >= 1.13.0, <= 1.31.3`

## Remediation

Upgrade to a patched release:

- `obsidian-tc 1.31.4`