Oc: oc: symlink/hardlink target validation bypass in oc image extract allows file write outside destination

Overview

A flaw was found in the OpenShift client oc. When extracting container image layers with oc image extract, the application fails to properly sanitize symbolic and hard link targets pointing to absolute paths or to sibling directories of the extraction destination. An attacker who supplies a malicious container image can exploit this vulnerability by embedding links, and a chained file entry, that reference locations outside the intended extraction directory. This allows the attacker to write attacker-controlled content to arbitrary locations on the host filesystem with the privileges of the user running the command, potentially leading to file modification outside the destination directory.

Affected

• openshift-clients (all versions)
• openshift/ose-rhel-coreos-8 (all versions)
• openshift/ose-rhel-coreos-9 (all versions)

Remediation

Refer to the linked advisories for vendor-supplied fixes and affected version ranges.

Workarounds

Treat container images as trusted inputs when using oc image extract. Do not extract images from registries or publishers you do not control or have not verified.

Where possible, run oc image extract as an unprivileged user and into a dedicated, isolated destination directory, and avoid fixed/predictable destination paths in automated or CI pipelines. Restrict who can modify the image references that automated extraction jobs consume.

There is no configuration option to disable only this link-extraction behavior. Apply updated oc client packages or rebuilt platform images when Red Hat publishes them for your product and stream.