---
id: CVE-2026-104795
title: >-
  The insights-runtime-extractor runs as a privileged DaemonSet (`hostPID:
  true`)

  that scans container processes for runtime fingerprinting
summary: >-
  The insights-runtime-extractor runs as a privileged DaemonSet (`hostPID:
  true`)

  that scans container processes for runtime fingerprinting. When scanning a

  container, the coordinator:


  1. **fork()s** a child process

  2. **setns()** into th…
severity: high
cvss: 8.8
cvssVector: 'CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H'
cwe:
  - CWE-250
published: '2026-10-14'
updated: '2026-10-14'
sourceUpdated: '2026-10-14T11:16:59.937'
source: NVD
sourceUrl: 'https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-104795'
references:
  - url: 'https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-104795'
    label: secalert@redhat.com
  - url: 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2543917'
    label: secalert@redhat.com
  - url: >-
      https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-104795.json
  - url: 'https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-104795'
  - url: 'https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-104795'
tags:
  - nvd
  - csaf
  - vex
  - red-hat
ingestedAt: '2026-10-14T11:27:22.143Z'
vendor: Red Hat
product: Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4
affected:
  - openshift_container_platform 4
---

## Overview

The insights-runtime-extractor runs as a privileged DaemonSet (`hostPID: true`)
that scans container processes for runtime fingerprinting. When scanning a
container, the coordinator:

1. **fork()s** a child process
2. **setns()** into the target container's PID and mount namespaces
3. **fchdir()** back to an orphaned FD pointing at the extractor's own root
   filesystem (where `/crio.sock` is hostPath-mounted)
4. Calls **only `seteuid(target_uid)`** — changing the effective UID but leaving
   the **real UID and saved-set-UID at 0** and **retaining the permitted
   capability set**
5. The `check_no_privileged_perms()` guard inspects only the Effective capability
   set (so it passes), and is **skipped entirely when the target runs as uid 0**
6. The `VersionExecutable` fingerprint invokes `fpr_kind_executable` with
   `process.command_line[0]` — the target's argv[0], read from
   `/proc/<pid>/cmdline` and **fully controlled by the workload**
7. `fpr_kind_executable` calls `exec.Command(executable, "--version").Output()`
   — executing the **workload's own binary** inside the workload's mount
   namespace while **ruid=0 in the host user namespace**

The executed process can call `setuid(0)` to restore full root with
`CAP_SYS_ADMIN`, and inherits the orphaned cwd which resolves into the extractor
container's filesystem containing the host CRI-O socket.

## Affected Code

### 1. Insufficient privilege drop (Rust — extractor coordinator)

**File:** `extractor/src/insights_runtime_extractor.rs`

```rust
// Lines 139-146 — seteuid-only drop, guard skipped for root containers
join_process_namespaces(process.pid)?;
change_dir(current_dir);
switch_user(*process.uid)?;
if *process.uid != 0 {
    perms::check_no_privileged_perms()
        .expect("Must not have privileged permissions to run fingerprints");
}
fingerprint::run_fingerprints(&config, out_dir, &process);
```

```rust
// Lines 182-185 — only effective UID changed; ruid/suid stay 0
fn switch_user(uid: u32) -> Result<(), ScannerError> {
    debug!("... Becoming user: {uid}");
    seteuid(uid.into()).map_err(|e| ScannerError::Errno(e))
}
```

### 2. Execution of untrusted binary (Go — fingerprint)

**File:** `fingerprints/pkg/utils/file.go`

```go
// Lines 75-80 — executes a path taken verbatim from workload's argv[0]
func GetExecutableVersionOutput(executable string) (string, error) {
    out, err := exec.Command(executable, "--version").Output()
    if err != nil {
        return "", err
    }
    return string(out), nil
}
```

### 3. Workload-controlled path forwarded (Rust — version_executable)

**File:** `version_executable.rs`

```rust
// Lines 29-34 — workload-controlled command_line[0] forwarded to fingerprint
return Some(vec![
    fpr_kind_executable,
    out_dir.to_string(),
    String::from(&process.command_line[0]),
    String::from(&version_executable.runtime_kind_name),
]);
```

## Attack Pattern

**Attacker:** Any tenant able to schedule a pod (unprivileged, any namespace)
**Victim:** The node running the insights-runtime-extractor DaemonSet
**Trigger:** Automatic — the DaemonSet scans all container processes on the node

**Attack sequence:**

1. Attacker creates a pod whose process name matches a configured
   versioned-executable pattern (`node`, `python`, `python3`, `MainThread`,
   or contains `java`)
2. The pod's main binary (at the path matching argv[0]) is a malicious
   executable that calls `setuid(0)` to restore root
3. When the insights operator triggers a scan, the DaemonSet forks, enters the
   attacker's mount namespace, and executes the attacker's binary with ruid=0
4. The attacker's code regains full root with `CAP_SYS_ADMIN` in the host user
   namespace
5. The inherited cwd contains the host CRI-O socket → full node compromise

## Remediation

Refer to the linked advisories for vendor-supplied fixes and affected version ranges.

## Vendor advisories

- **Red Hat VEX** · Important · affected: Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4 · no fix planned: Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4 · updated 2026-10-14 · [vex](https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-104795.json)