Claude Code validated that a target file path resided within the project working directory at permission-check time, but re-resolved the path at write time without repeating that validation

Overview

Claude Code validated that a target file path resided within the project working directory at permission-check time, but re-resolved the path at write time without repeating that validation. This time-of-check to time-of-use (TOCTOU) gap allowed an attacker who could write to the workspace to atomically replace a project file with a symlink, causing Claude Code to follow the symlink and write its output to an arbitrary file outside the project sandbox. Exploitation required the ability to win a race condition against the write operation and write access to the shared workspace, enabling a lower-privileged attacker to redirect benign edits to sensitive files (e.g., shell configuration) in a higher-privileged session.

Users on standard Claude Code auto-update have received this fix already. Users performing manual updates are advised to update to the latest version.

Thank you to hackerone.com/c_h4ck_0 for reporting this issue.

Remediation

Refer to the linked advisories for vendor-supplied fixes and affected version ranges.