CVE-2026-102714High· 7.1▾ Twilight`_nx_icmpv6_validate_options()` scans the option area with `while (length > 2)` (`common/src/nx_icmpv6_validate_options.c:79`). An area whose size leaves a one- or two-byte residue exits the loop with that tail unexamined; the residue is…
▾ Twilight zone — High severity, or a signal on a lesser flaw
impact 39.1 · likelihood 0 · exploitation 0
Need a working PoC? Pro members can cast a request and our team develops one — it lands right here.
_nx_icmpv6_validate_options() scans the option area with while (length > 2) (common/src/nx_icmpv6_validate_options.c:79). An area whose size leaves a one- or two-byte residue exits the loop with that tail unexamined; the residue is not negative, so the function returns NX_SUCCESS. Its zero-length rejection never sees those bytes.
Every consumer then re-walks the same area, reading a two-byte option header at the residue and subtracting nx_icmpv6_option_length << 3 with no zero check and no remaining-length check. Three outcomes follow, selected by bytes the attacker controls.
Zero length byte. The walker subtracts zero and advances zero. All four handlers loop forever — _nx_icmpv6_process_ra (nx_icmpv6_process_ra.c:245, :528), _nx_icmpv6_process_ns (:251, :329), _nx_icmpv6_process_na (:147, :156) and _nx_icmpv6_process_redirect (:247, :350). The walk runs in the IP thread, which is the highest-priority thread and does not yield inside the loop, so the system stops until a watchdog reset and the frame can be replayed after each one.
Non-zero length byte on a short residue. The three unsigned counters underflow — 2 - 8 becomes 0xFFFFFFFA — and the walk continues past the packet buffer, reading until it faults or meets a zero length byte and freezes. The Router Advertisement counter is signed and exits cleanly in this case.
One-byte residue. The walker reads a two-byte option header, over-reading one byte.
During a runaway walk, stray bytes parsing as a link-layer address option are copied into the neighbor cache (nx_icmpv6_process_ns.c:280, :293) and subsequently used as the destination MAC for frames to that neighbour, placing off-packet memory on the link. Confirmed by inspection, not reproduced.
Refer to the linked advisories for vendor-supplied fixes and affected version ranges.
Connected by shared product, vendor, weakness, or advisory.
CVE-2026-102726Medium· 6.0Unbounded PPP IPCP Option Parsing Causes a Worker Stall and Out-of-bounds Read
CVE-2026-102725Medium· 6.0Out-of-bounds Read from Unvalidated MSRP Attribute List Length
CVE-2026-102721Medium· 6.9A TFTP server that answers with a short ERROR packet makes the client read up to 64 bytes past the received datagram. Each receive path checks only that the datagram is at least four bytes long (nxd_tftp_client.c:1229, 1521, 198…
CVE-2026-102718High· 8.7hey, `_nx_snmp_utility_object_id_get` in the NetX Duo SNMP addon does not validate the claimed OID data length against the actual buffer size when the OID uses BER multibyte length encoding, so a remote attacker can send a crafted SNM…
CVE-2026-102712High· 8.8On the first DTLS ClientHello, the parser copies a device-claimed session_id length and validates the ciphersuite-list length against the total record length instead of the remaining bytes
CVE-2026-102713High· 8.8The TFTP server accepts a DATA datagram of any size