---
id: CVE-2026-100371
title: >-
  InvoicePlane is a self-hosted open source application for managing invoices,
  clients, and payments
summary: >-
  InvoicePlane is a self-hosted open source application for managing invoices,
  clients, and payments. In version 1.7.2, an authorization guard to
  Users::change_password(), was added to address a previous authorization flaw
  that allowed a s…
severity: high
cvss: 8.7
cvssVector: 'CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N'
cwe:
  - CWE-863
vendor: InvoicePlane
product: InvoicePlane
affected:
  - InvoicePlane = 1.7.2
published: '2026-09-28'
updated: '2026-09-28'
sourceUpdated: '2026-09-28T21:17:11.653'
source: NVD
sourceUrl: 'https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-100371'
references:
  - url: >-
      https://github.com/InvoicePlane/InvoicePlane/commit/8616fa45a61c1694b55bb9116e293269a0ced06a
    label: security-advisories@github.com
  - url: 'https://github.com/InvoicePlane/InvoicePlane/pull/1638'
    label: security-advisories@github.com
  - url: >-
      https://github.com/InvoicePlane/InvoicePlane/security/advisories/GHSA-77hm-22wp-96wp
    label: security-advisories@github.com
tags:
  - nvd
  - cve.org
cvssSource: cna
ingestedAt: '2026-09-28T21:20:54.774Z'
---

## Overview

InvoicePlane is a self-hosted open source application for managing invoices, clients, and payments. In version 1.7.2, an authorization guard to Users::change_password(), was added to address a previous authorization flaw that allowed a secondary administrator (user_type=1, user_id != 1) to directly change the password of the primary administrator (user_id=1) through users/change_password/{id}. That remediation, however, protects only the direct password-change operation. It does not protect the identity attribute that password recovery actually trusts: user_email. Users::form() applies no equivalent object-level authorization check when editing the primary administrator's account, and user_email is not included in PROTECTED_FIELDS. A secondary administrator can therefore rewrite the primary administrator's email address, then drive the public password-recovery flow — which resolves the account by user_email — to receive the reset token and take over user_id=1. The result is an alternate attack path that achieves the same impact PR #1638 was intended to prevent: cross-administrator full account takeover of the primary administrator. This issue has been patched via commit 8616fa4.

## Remediation

Refer to the linked advisories for vendor-supplied fixes and affected version ranges.