---
id: CVE-2025-64526
title: Strapi is an open source headless content management system
summary: >-
  Strapi is an open source headless content management system. In Strapi
  versions prior to 5.45.0, the rate-limit middleware in the users-permissions
  plugin derived its rate-limit key in part from `ctx.request.body.email`,
  including on rou…
severity: medium
cvss: 5.3
cvssVector: 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L'
cwe:
  - CWE-307
vendor: strapi
product: strapi
affected:
  - strapi < 5.45.0
patched:
  - strapi 5.45.0
published: '2026-05-14'
updated: '2026-10-14'
sourceUpdated: '2026-10-14T13:10:00.187'
source: NVD
sourceUrl: 'https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-64526'
references:
  - url: >-
      https://github.com/strapi/strapi/commit/5e0d243cba9830e6f791de6a94798bcde51468db
    label: security-advisories@github.com
  - url: 'https://github.com/strapi/strapi/pull/24818'
    label: security-advisories@github.com
  - url: 'https://github.com/strapi/strapi/releases/tag/v5.45.0'
    label: security-advisories@github.com
  - url: 'https://github.com/strapi/strapi/security/advisories/GHSA-7mqx-wwh4-f9fw'
    label: security-advisories@github.com
tags:
  - nvd
epss: 0.00492
epssPercentile: 0.40586
ingestedAt: '2026-10-14T13:30:58.500Z'
---

## Overview

Strapi is an open source headless content management system. In Strapi versions prior to 5.45.0, the rate-limit middleware in the users-permissions plugin derived its rate-limit key in part from `ctx.request.body.email`, including on routes whose body schema does not contain an `email` field (`/auth/local`, `/auth/reset-password`, `/auth/change-password`). An unauthenticated attacker could include an arbitrary `email` value in the request body to obtain a fresh rate-limit key per request, effectively bypassing per-IP throttling on those routes and enabling high-volume credential brute-force, password-reset code brute-force, and credential-stuffing attempts. The rate-limit key was constructed as `${userIdentifier}:${requestPath}:${ctx.request.ip}`, where `userIdentifier = ctx.request.body.email`. On routes that legitimately use email as their identifier (e.g. `/auth/forgot-password`, `/auth/local/register`), this scoping is correct. On routes that use a different identifier (`identifier` for login, `code` for password reset, `currentPassword` for password change), the email field was not part of the route contract, but the middleware still incorporated it into the key, allowing a caller to rotate the value and obtain a unique key on every request. The patch in version 5.45.0 maintains an allow-list of routes that legitimately key on the email field and excludes that key component on every other route the middleware is mounted on. OAuth callback paths (`/connect/*`) are treated identifier-less. On routes outside the allow-list, the middleware now falls back to a fixed identifier-less key, ensuring per-IP throttling remains effective even when the request body is attacker-controlled.

## Affected

- `strapi < 5.45.0`

## Remediation

Upgrade past the affected range:

- `strapi 5.45.0`