CVE-2023-47090High▾ TwilightNATS.io: Adding accounts for just the system account adds auth bypass
▾ Twilight zone — High severity, or a signal on a lesser flaw
impact 41.3 · likelihood 0.1 · exploitation 0
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Exploit-prediction probability, daily snapshots since Jul 9.
Disclosure to exploitation, from the record and what we observed since indexing it.
Disclosed via OSV
Last analysed / modified upstream
0.7%
NATS.io is a high performance open source pub-sub distributed communication technology, built for the cloud, on-premise, IoT, and edge computing.
NATS users exist within accounts, and once using accounts, the old authorization block is not applicable.
Without any authorization rules in the nats-server, users can connect without authentication.
Before nats-server 2.2.0, all authentication and authorization rules for a nats-server lived in an "authorization" block, defining users. With nats-server 2.2.0 all users live inside accounts. When using the authorization block, whose syntax predates this, those users will be placed into the implicit global account, "$G". Users inside accounts go into the newer "accounts" block.
If an "accounts" block is defined, in simple deployment scenarios this is often used only to enable client access to the system account. When the only account added is the system account "$SYS", the nats-server would create an implicit user in "$G" and set it as the no_auth_user account, enabling the same "without authentication" logic as without any rules.
This preserved the ability to connect simply, and then add one authenticated login for system access.
But with an "authorization" block, this is wrong. Users exist in the global account, with login rules. And in simple testing, they might still connect fine without administrators seeing that authentication has been disabled.
The blind-spot on our part came from encouraging and documenting a switch to using only "accounts", instead of "authorization".
In the fixed versions, using an "authorization" block will inhibit the implicit creation of a "$G" user and setting it as the no_auth_user target. In unfixed versions, just creating a second account, with no users, will also inhibit this behavior.
NATS Server:
In the "accounts" block, define a second non-system account, leave it empty.
accounts {
SYS: {
users: [
{ user: sysuser, password: makemeasandwich }
]
}
DUMMY: {} # for security, before 2.10.2
}
system_account: SYS
Any one of these:
Problem reported by Alex Herrington.
Addressed publicly in a GitHub Discussion prior to this advisory.
github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2 >= 2.2.0, < 2.9.23github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2 >= 2.10.0, < 2.10.2Upgrade to a patched release:
github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2 2.9.23github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2 2.10.2Connected by shared product, vendor, weakness, or advisory.
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