CVE-2021-21291Medium· 5.4▾ SunlitSubdomain checking of whitelisted domains could allow unintended redirects in oauth2-proxy
▾ Sunlit zone — Low / medium · no exploitation signal
impact 29.7 · likelihood 0.3 · exploitation 0
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Exploit-prediction probability, daily snapshots since Sep 12.
Disclosure to exploitation, from the record and what we observed since indexing it.
Disclosed via OSV
Last analysed / modified upstream
1.6%
What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted? For users that use the whitelist domain feature, a domain that ended in a similar way to the intended domain could have been allowed as a redirect.
For example, if a whitelist domain was configured for .example.com, the intention is that subdomains of example.com are allowed.
Instead, example.com and badexample.com could also match.
Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to? This is fixed in version 7.0.0 onwards.
Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading? Disable the whitelist domain feature and run separate OAuth2 Proxy instances for each subdomain.
Whitelist Domain feature is not working as expected because is not matching a dot to ensure the redirect is a subdomain.
If whitelist domain is set to .example.com , then hack.alienexample.com should be rejected as a valid redirect.
The code is removing the dot from .example.com and only checking if the redirect string end with example.com
Include the dot when checking the string:
strings.HasSuffix(redirectHostname, "." + domainHostname)
package main
import (
"fmt"
"strings"
)
func validOptionalPort(port string) bool {
if port == "" || port == ":*" {
return true
}
if port[0] != ':' {
return false
}
for _, b := range port[1:] {
if b < '0' || b > '9' {
return false
}
}
return true
}
func splitHostPort(hostport string) (host, port string) {
host = hostport
colon := strings.LastIndexByte(host, ':')
if colon != -1 && validOptionalPort(host[colon:]) {
host, port = host[:colon], host[colon+1:]
}
if strings.HasPrefix(host, "[") && strings.HasSuffix(host, "]") {
host = host[1 : len(host)-1]
}
return
}
func main() {
domain := ".example.com"
domainHostname, _ := splitHostPort(strings.TrimLeft(domain, "."))
redirectHostname := "https://hack.alienexample.com"
if (strings.HasPrefix(domain, ".") && strings.HasSuffix(redirectHostname, domainHostname)) { fmt.Println("This should not have happen.")}
}
Users of github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy are advised to update to github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7
github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7 < 7.0.0github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy <= 3.2.0Upgrade to a patched release:
github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7 7.0.0Connected by shared product, vendor, weakness, or advisory.
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