{"id":"GHSA-vxr8-fq34-vvx9","title":"DOMPurify: Trusted Types policy survives `clearConfig()` and can poison later `RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE` output","summary":"DOMPurify: Trusted Types policy survives `clearConfig()` and can poison later `RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE` output","severity":"low","cwe":["CWE-693"],"vendor":"dompurify","product":"dompurify","ecosystem":"npm","affected":["dompurify < 3.4.9"],"patched":["dompurify 3.4.9"],"published":"2026-06-15","updated":"2026-06-15","source":"GHSA","sourceUrl":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-vxr8-fq34-vvx9","references":[{"url":"https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/security/advisories/GHSA-vxr8-fq34-vvx9"},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-vxr8-fq34-vvx9"}],"tags":["ghsa","npm"],"ingestedAt":"2026-07-07T15:41:58.670Z","slug":"GHSA-vxr8-fq34-vvx9","body":"## Overview\n\n## Impact\n\nA DOMPurify instance that is reused across trust boundaries can stay bound to a previously supplied `TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY` even after `clearConfig()` is called. A later caller that requests `RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE` receives a `TrustedHTML` object created by the old policy, not by a clean default configuration.\n\nIf the old policy is unsafe or controlled by a less-trusted integration, this turns a later \"default\" sanitize call into script execution at a Trusted Types sink. `TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY: null` on the later call also does not clear the retained policy.\n[dompurify-trusted-types-policy-survives-clearconfig-poc.js](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/28604913/dompurify-trusted-types-policy-survives-clearconfig-poc.js)\n\n\n## Affected version\n\nTested against DOMPurify `3.4.8`, repository commit `825e617753ac1169306a542d3174a77f717a0cf6`.\n\n## Root cause\n\n`_parseConfig()` overwrites `trustedTypesPolicy` when `cfg.TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY` is truthy, but the default/null path only initializes the internal policy when `trustedTypesPolicy === undefined`. Once a custom policy has been set, later default config parsing leaves it in place.\n\nRelevant code:\n\n- `src/purify.ts:786-812` accepts and stores `cfg.TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY`.\n- `src/purify.ts:813-832` does not reset an existing policy when config has no policy or has `TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY: null`.\n- `src/purify.ts:2123-2125` signs the final serialized HTML with the retained policy when `RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE` is true.\n- `src/purify.ts:2133-2136` `clearConfig()` only clears `CONFIG` and `SET_CONFIG`; it does not reset `trustedTypesPolicy` or `emptyHTML`.\n\n## Local PoC\n\nRun from the DOMPurify checkout, or set `DOMPURIFY_REPO`:\n\n```bash\nnode /home/dompurify-trusted-types-policy-survives-clearconfig-poc.js\n```\n\nObserved output:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"result\": {\n    \"baseline\": \"<b>baseline</b>\",\n    \"duringPolicy\": \"<img src=x onerror=alert(\\\"TT_POLICY_SURVIVED_CLEARCONFIG\\\")>\",\n    \"afterClearString\": \"<img src=\\\"x\\\">\",\n    \"afterClearTrustedType\": \"[object TrustedHTML]\",\n    \"afterClearTrusted\": \"<img src=x onerror=alert(\\\"TT_POLICY_SURVIVED_CLEARCONFIG\\\")>\",\n    \"afterNullTrusted\": \"<img src=x onerror=alert(\\\"TT_POLICY_SURVIVED_CLEARCONFIG\\\")>\",\n    \"mountedHTML\": \"<img src=\\\"x\\\" onerror=\\\"alert(&quot;TT_POLICY_SURVIVED_CLEARCONFIG&quot;)\\\">\"\n  },\n  \"dialogs\": [\n    \"TT_POLICY_SURVIVED_CLEARCONFIG\"\n  ]\n}\n```\n\nThe important part is the split behavior after cleanup:\n\n- `purify.clearConfig(); purify.sanitize(...);` returns a normal sanitized string (`<img src=\"x\">`), because the later call is not asking for a Trusted Type.\n- `purify.clearConfig(); purify.sanitize(..., { RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE: true });` still uses the old policy and returns attacker-controlled `TrustedHTML`.\n- Passing `{ TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY: null, RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE: true }` also still returns attacker-controlled `TrustedHTML`.\n\n## Preconditions\n\nThis is a shared-instance state contamination issue. It matters when one DOMPurify instance is reused by multiple integrations, plugins, request handlers, or components with different trust levels, and a cleanup step relies on `clearConfig()` to restore safe defaults.\n\nThis is not a default string-input bypass. An attacker must be able to influence a prior `TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY` on the reused instance, or a less-trusted integration must have installed an unsafe policy.\n\n## Severity\n\n impact is XSS at a Trusted Types sink in applications that reuse a DOMPurify instance across trust boundaries. Attack complexity is high because exploitation depends on prior policy injection or a less-trusted integration and a later `RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE` sink.\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nMake `clearConfig()` reset Trusted Types state as part of restoring defaults, or have `_parseConfig()` explicitly clear `trustedTypesPolicy` and `emptyHTML` when `TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY: null` is supplied.\n\n## Affected packages\n\n- `dompurify < 3.4.9`\n\n## Remediation\n\nUpgrade to a patched release:\n\n- `dompurify 3.4.9`","depth":"sunlit","depthScore":14,"depthScoreParts":{"impact":13.8,"likelihood":0,"exploitation":0,"ransomware":0},"changes":[]}