{"id":"GHSA-f25v-x6vr-962g","title":"Pheditor: Authentication Bypass in Forced Password-Change Flow via Unverified Current Password","summary":"Pheditor: Authentication Bypass in Forced Password-Change Flow via Unverified Current Password","severity":"critical","cvss":10,"cwe":["CWE-1392"],"vendor":"pheditor","product":"pheditor/pheditor","ecosystem":"composer","affected":["pheditor/pheditor < 2.0.8"],"patched":["pheditor/pheditor 2.0.8"],"published":"2026-07-24","updated":"2026-07-24","source":"GHSA","sourceUrl":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-f25v-x6vr-962g","references":[{"url":"https://github.com/pheditor/pheditor/security/advisories/GHSA-f25v-x6vr-962g"},{"url":"https://github.com/pheditor/pheditor/commit/0978bcda644832b67357340e2f271e32d86fdf86"},{"url":"https://github.com/pheditor/pheditor/releases/tag/2.0.8"},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-f25v-x6vr-962g"}],"tags":["ghsa","composer"],"ingestedAt":"2026-07-24T22:40:26.830Z","slug":"GHSA-f25v-x6vr-962g","body":"## Overview\n\n## Summary\n\nThe forced password-change flow, triggered when the stored password is still the default (`admin`), does not verify that the password submitted by the client actually matches the current password. Any non-empty value in `pheditor_password` is enough to reach the password-change form, and submitting `pheditor_new_password` / `pheditor_confirm_password` in the same request is enough to set an arbitrary new password and obtain an authenticated session — without ever proving knowledge of the current password.\n\n## Root Cause\n\n`pheditor.php` line 163:\n\n```php\nif (PASSWORD == hash('sha512', 'admin')) { // still default — force change prompt\n```\n\nThis checks whether the **stored** `PASSWORD` constant is still the default value. It does not check whether the **submitted** `pheditor_password` matches it. As a result, on any instance that hasn't changed the default password, the check passes regardless of what the client actually sends, and the subsequent password-change branch is reachable without authentication.\n\n## PoC\n\n```bash\nTARGET=\"https://victim.com/pheditor.php\"\n\n# Any non-empty value works here — password is never actually verified\ncurl -c /tmp/j.txt \\\n  -d 'pheditor_password=anything' \\\n  -d 'pheditor_new_password=attacker123' \\\n  -d 'pheditor_confirm_password=attacker123' \\\n  \"$TARGET\" -L -s -o /dev/null\n\n# Session is now authenticated as admin, with the password changed to attacker123\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nOn any instance where the default password has not yet been changed, an unauthenticated attacker can set an arbitrary new admin password and obtain a fully authenticated session, without knowing the current password. This is a complete authentication bypass, not merely \"default credentials in use\" — it holds even if the operator believes the instance is protected because the login form is present.\n\n## Remediation\n\nVerify the submitted password against the stored `PASSWORD` constant *before* entering the forced password-change branch, so the flow is reachable only by someone who actually knows the current password:\n\n```php\n$submitted_hash = hash('sha512', $_POST['pheditor_password']);\n\nif (PASSWORD == hash('sha512', 'admin') && $submitted_hash === PASSWORD) {\n    // proceed to forced password-change flow\n} else {\n    // treat as a normal login attempt (including rate-limiting)\n}\n```\n\n## Note on scope\n\nThe original report submitted alongside this finding also included two additional items:\n\n- **Unrestricted PHP upload** — addressed as intended behavior (Pheditor is a single-admin PHP file editor; PHP file creation/editing is core to its function, and pattern-restricting only the upload path doesn't reduce risk since the same result is reachable via the `save`/`newfile` action). Documented explicitly in the README's new Security Model section.\n- **Terminal allowlist bypass (`php -r ...`)** — a duplicate of a previously reported and already-patched issue (GHSA-g3hq-hphg-8fhh, fixed in v2.0.7).\n\nThis advisory has been scoped to the authentication bypass specifically, since it's a distinct root cause from both of those. Full responses to all three points are in the comments below.\n\n## Affected packages\n\n- `pheditor/pheditor < 2.0.8`\n\n## Remediation\n\nUpgrade to a patched release:\n\n- `pheditor/pheditor 2.0.8`","depth":"midnight","depthScore":55,"depthScoreParts":{"impact":55,"likelihood":0,"exploitation":0,"ransomware":0},"changes":[]}