{"id":"GHSA-cc2g-gq8c-r332","title":"grok-faf-mcp has an arbitrary local file read via unconfined `path` argument in FAF tools","summary":"grok-faf-mcp has an arbitrary local file read via unconfined `path` argument in FAF tools","severity":"high","cvss":7.5,"cwe":["CWE-22","CWE-73","CWE-200"],"vendor":"grok-faf-mcp","product":"grok-faf-mcp","ecosystem":"npm","affected":["grok-faf-mcp <= 1.5.2"],"patched":["grok-faf-mcp 1.5.3"],"published":"2026-08-19","updated":"2026-08-19","source":"GHSA","sourceUrl":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-cc2g-gq8c-r332","references":[{"url":"https://github.com/Wolfe-Jam/grok-faf-mcp/security/advisories/GHSA-cc2g-gq8c-r332"},{"url":"https://github.com/Wolfe-Jam/grok-faf-mcp/releases/tag/v1.5.3"},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-cc2g-gq8c-r332"}],"tags":["ghsa","npm"],"ingestedAt":"2026-08-19T19:44:03.406Z","slug":"GHSA-cc2g-gq8c-r332","body":"## Overview\n\n### Summary\nSeveral `grok-faf-mcp` MCP tools accept a caller-controlled `path` argument and resolve it (`~` expansion + `path.resolve()`) straight into a filesystem read **without confining it to a trusted project directory**. An absolute path or `../` traversal is resolved and used as-is, so the server process can be made to read files outside the intended `.faf` project context. The only remaining limit is OS file permissions.\n\n### Affected tools\n`refresh_faf`, `faf_score`, `faf_get_orchestration_policy`, `refresh_blend` (and the shared `getProjectPath()` chokepoint feeding the `.faf` tools), plus the general-purpose `faf_read` / `faf_write` file tools (denylist-only; an absolute path still reached home-directory secrets, and `faf_write` could write outside the project). `refresh_faf` echoes the file contents verbatim back to the caller as \"fresh DNA\"; `faf_get_orchestration_policy` reflects values parsed out of the attacker-chosen file and echoes the resolved absolute path — confirming the read.\n\n### Impact\nAn MCP client — or an LLM prompt-injected via attacker-controlled content (a web page, README, ticket, or `.faf`) into issuing a tool call — can read any file the server process can read: SSH keys (`~/.ssh/id_rsa`), cloud credentials (`~/.aws/credentials`), `.env` files, source, `/etc/passwd`. This is a sensitive-information-disclosure (CWE-200) primitive that far exceeds the declared `.faf` project-context scope. The server runs over stdio, so the read is reached by a crafted tool call (e.g. a prompt-injected agent processing attacker-controlled content).\n\n### Patches\nFixed in **1.5.3** by confining every caller-supplied `path` before any filesystem access (`safe-path.ts`):\n- Reads are restricted to `.faf` / `.fafm` context files, so non-context files (secrets) are refused regardless of directory.\n- General file ops (`faf_read` / `faf_write`) are confined to the project root (cwd + system temp; override with `FAF_ALLOWED_ROOTS`).\n- Paths are canonicalized through symlinks (closing the symlink bypass); absolute paths and `../` escapes are rejected.\n\nUpgrade: `npm install -g grok-faf-mcp@1.5.3` (or `bunx grok-faf-mcp`).\n\n### Workarounds\nIf you cannot upgrade immediately, run the server only against trusted local projects, and set `FAF_ALLOWED_ROOTS` (patched versions) to a single project directory for a hard directory boundary.\n\n### Credits\nDiscovered and responsibly reported via coordinated disclosure by **Zhihao Zhang** (Worcester Polytechnic Institute).\n\n## Affected packages\n\n- `grok-faf-mcp <= 1.5.2`\n\n## Remediation\n\nUpgrade to a patched release:\n\n- `grok-faf-mcp 1.5.3`","depth":"twilight","depthScore":41,"depthScoreParts":{"impact":41.3,"likelihood":0,"exploitation":0,"ransomware":0},"changes":[]}