{"id":"CVE-2026-97910","title":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nASoC: sprd: validate compress buffer sizes against fixed allocations\n\nsprd_platform_compr_open() allocates the stage 0 IRAM buffer (32K data\narea) and the stage 1 DDR b…","summary":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nASoC: sprd: validate compress buffer sizes against fixed allocations\n\nsprd_platform_compr_open() allocates the stage 0 IRAM buffer (32K data\narea) and the stage 1 DDR b…","severity":"none","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","affected":["Linux >= cce1396936ef2b347d622b4d49718818eb32029d < 38a9bb5221bcdece5507299f739c6751d8fc16b2","Linux >= cce1396936ef2b347d622b4d49718818eb32029d < ff63b0adc4f6a5b61c8393d204fac44c594c4d39","Linux >= cce1396936ef2b347d622b4d49718818eb32029d < 8064b73997f137c00a7e2e38295a763f9423928b","Linux >= cce1396936ef2b347d622b4d49718818eb32029d < 7a4ce92d150b9e7ecf1a710a34d8cdeb590d3751","Linux 5.2"],"published":"2026-09-25","updated":"2026-09-25","sourceUpdated":"2026-09-25T11:17:17.957","source":"NVD","sourceUrl":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-97910","references":[{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/38a9bb5221bcdece5507299f739c6751d8fc16b2","label":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7a4ce92d150b9e7ecf1a710a34d8cdeb590d3751","label":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8064b73997f137c00a7e2e38295a763f9423928b","label":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ff63b0adc4f6a5b61c8393d204fac44c594c4d39","label":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"}],"tags":["nvd","cve.org"],"ingestedAt":"2026-09-25T11:06:38.892Z","slug":"CVE-2026-97910","body":"## Overview\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nASoC: sprd: validate compress buffer sizes against fixed allocations\n\nsprd_platform_compr_open() allocates the stage 0 IRAM buffer (32K data\narea) and the stage 1 DDR buffer (2M data area) with fixed sizes, but\nsprd_platform_compr_copy() derives all copy lengths from the user\ncontrolled runtime->fragment_size and the write() count, never\ncomparing them against the physical buffer sizes. The compress core\nonly checks fragment_size * fragments for an u32 overflow in\nsnd_compress_check_input(), so a local user can configure a logical\nbuffer of up to ~4GB via SNDRV_COMPRESS_SET_PARAMS, far exceeding the\nfixed allocations.\n\nA fragment_size larger than the 32K IRAM data area makes the stage 0\ncopy_from_user() overflow past the IRAM allocation, and a buffer_size\nlarger than the 2M DDR buffer makes the wrapping copy at the end of\nsprd_platform_compr_copy() write fully user controlled data past the\nbuffer. No SNDRV_PCM_TRIGGER_START is needed, a write() in SETUP\nstate reaches the copy callback directly.\n\nReject parameters that do not fit into the fixed buffers in\nset_params(), and fix the advertised max fragment size: 128K never\nfitted into the 32K IRAM buffer. The caps values may have been carried over\nfrom the qdsp6 driver, which allocates its buffers according to the\nadvertised maxima, unlike this driver. With 32K as max fragment size\nthe advertised limits are self-consistent: 32K * 64 = 2M equals the\nDDR buffer size.\n\nDiscovered by Atuin - Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine.\n\n## Remediation\n\nRefer to the linked advisories for vendor-supplied fixes and affected version ranges.","depth":"sunlit","depthScore":3,"depthScoreParts":{"impact":2.8,"likelihood":0,"exploitation":0,"ransomware":0},"changes":[]}