{"id":"CVE-2026-96627","aliases":["GHSA-pw5q-rjx4-7f7p"],"title":"Arcane: Delegated users:update permission allows admin account takeover via password reset (no privilege-hierarchy check)","summary":"Arcane: Delegated users:update permission allows admin account takeover via password reset (no privilege-hierarchy check)","severity":"high","cvss":8.8,"cwe":["CWE-266","CWE-269"],"vendor":"getarcaneapp","product":"github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/backend/v2","ecosystem":"go","affected":["github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/backend/v2 < 2.6.0"],"patched":["github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/backend/v2 2.6.0"],"published":"2026-10-16","updated":"2026-10-16","sourceUpdated":"2026-10-16T21:15:06Z","source":"GHSA","sourceUrl":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-pw5q-rjx4-7f7p","references":[{"url":"https://github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/security/advisories/GHSA-pw5q-rjx4-7f7p"},{"url":"https://github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/pull/3426"},{"url":"https://github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/commit/21ea962f86d967dac8ae02a050f6e5f043d10fa1"},{"url":"https://github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/releases/tag/backend/v2.6.0"},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-pw5q-rjx4-7f7p"}],"tags":["ghsa","go","cve.org"],"ingestedAt":"2026-10-16T21:53:23.549Z","slug":"CVE-2026-96627","body":"## Overview\n\n## Summary\nA user holding the delegated `users:update` permission can reset the global administrator's password and take over the admin account. `UpdateUser` sets the target user's `PasswordHash` from the request body for ANY target with no comparison of caller-vs-target privilege. Because role assignment and role CRUD are deliberately gated by `RequireGlobalAdmin`, `users:update` is intended to sit BELOW admin (profile management); this finding defeats that separation.\n\n## Root Cause\n`UpdateUser` (handler `backend/api/handlers/users.go:317-323`) loads the target by ID and sets `userModel.PasswordHash` from the request body for any user, then `userService.UpdateUser` (`user_service.go:174`) simply `tx.Save`s — with NO actor-vs-target privilege comparison. The only `IsGlobalAdmin` guard (`user_service.go:345`) is a last-admin check inside `DeleteUser`, not the update path. Role assignment / role CRUD are `RequireGlobalAdmin` (`backend/pkg/authz/permissions.go:27-33`), proving `users:update` is intended below admin.\n\n## Impact\nComplete administrator account takeover (C:H/I:H/A:H) by any holder of the delegated `users:update` permission.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n1. Admin delegates a custom \"User Manager\" role with `users:update`.\n2. `PUT /users/{adminId}` with `{\"password\":\"attacker123\"}`.\n3. `POST /auth/login {\"username\":\"arcane\",\"password\":\"attacker123\"}` → admin session.\n\n## Attack Chain\n1. Action: admin delegates custom role with `users:update`. Guard: role creation is `RequireGlobalAdmin`. Bypass: intended delegation (holder is meant to manage profiles, not seize admin).\n2. Action: `PUT /users/{adminId}` `{\"password\":\"attacker123\"}`. Guard: `RequirePermission(users:update)` (`users.go:154`). Bypass: holder has it; no hierarchy check (`users.go:317-323`, `user_service.go:174` unconditional Save).\n3. Action: `POST /auth/login` as admin → admin session.\n\n## Bypass Evidence\n- `users.go:317-323` sets `PasswordHash` for any target; `user_service.go:174-194` has no actor/target privilege comparison.\n- Only `IsGlobalAdmin` hits are `DeleteUser`'s last-admin guard and DTO flags (grep).\n- `users:update` is org-level, held by no built-in non-admin role (`permissions.go:24`).\n\n## Affected Versions\n`<= 2.5.0`.\n\nReported by **zx (Jace)** — GitHub: @manus-use\n\n## Affected packages\n\n- `github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/backend/v2 < 2.6.0`\n\n## Remediation\n\nUpgrade to a patched release:\n\n- `github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/backend/v2 2.6.0`","depth":"twilight","depthScore":48,"depthScoreParts":{"impact":48.4,"likelihood":0,"exploitation":0,"ransomware":0},"changes":[]}