{"id":"CVE-2026-92975","title":"The Groundhogg — CRM, Newsletters, and Marketing Automation plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 4.8.3 via the `create_support_user()` function","summary":"The Groundhogg — CRM, Newsletters, and Marketing Automation plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 4.8.3 via the `create_support_user()` function. This is due to the function iden…","severity":"high","cvss":8.1,"cvssVector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","cwe":["CWE-269"],"published":"2026-10-10","updated":"2026-10-10","sourceUpdated":"2026-10-10T06:16:44.253","source":"NVD","sourceUrl":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-92975","references":[{"url":"https://github.com/groundhoggwp/groundhogg/commit/4b413aa6e","label":"security@wordfence.com"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/groundhogg/tags/4.8.1/admin/help/help-page.php#L224","label":"security@wordfence.com"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/groundhogg/tags/4.8.1/admin/help/help-page.php#L238","label":"security@wordfence.com"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/groundhogg/tags/4.8.1/admin/help/help-page.php#L250","label":"security@wordfence.com"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/groundhogg/tags/4.8.1/admin/help/help-page.php#L298","label":"security@wordfence.com"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/groundhogg/tags/4.8.1/admin/help/help-page.php#L599","label":"security@wordfence.com"},{"url":"https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/c355658a-515a-48ed-a114-6a202e23e34b?source=cve","label":"security@wordfence.com"}],"tags":["nvd"],"ingestedAt":"2026-10-10T06:24:42.872Z","slug":"CVE-2026-92975","body":"## Overview\n\nThe Groundhogg — CRM, Newsletters, and Marketing Automation plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 4.8.3 via the `create_support_user()` function. This is due to the function identifying the support account solely by matching against publicly hardcoded constants — `user_login` `'groundhogg'` and email addresses `'support@groundhogg.io'` / `'help@groundhogg.io'` — where the `in_array()` email-equality check at line 238 is not a security boundary because any user fully controls their own email value. This makes it possible for an attacker with an account whose `user_login` is `'groundhogg'` and whose `user_email` matches one of the hardcoded support constants to have that account silently promoted to administrator — and additionally to super admin on multisite when the triggering administrator holds `manage_network_options` — resulting in full site takeover. Exploitation requires a two-actor flow: the attacker must first obtain or pre-plant an account with the hardcoded credentials (possible when open user registration is enabled or another account-creation path exists), after which a legitimate administrator must invoke the support-access feature via the `submit_ticket` or `process_send_support_access` entry points to trigger the promotion.\n\n## Remediation\n\nRefer to the linked advisories for vendor-supplied fixes and affected version ranges.","depth":"twilight","depthScore":45,"depthScoreParts":{"impact":44.6,"likelihood":0,"exploitation":0,"ransomware":0},"changes":[]}