{"id":"CVE-2026-91012","title":"org.apache.karaf.config.core.impl.ConfigRepositoryImpl#update(pid, properties),\nwhich backs the \"config\" MBean and the config:* shell commands, derives the file\nit writes a configuration to from caller-supplied input without checking tha…","summary":"org.apache.karaf.config.core.impl.ConfigRepositoryImpl#update(pid, properties),\nwhich backs the \"config\" MBean and the config:* shell commands, derives the file\nit writes a configuration to from caller-supplied input without checking tha…","severity":"none","vendor":"Apache Software Foundation","product":"org.apache.karaf.config.core.impl","affected":["org.apache.karaf.config.core.impl < 4.4.12"],"published":"2026-09-29","updated":"2026-09-29","sourceUpdated":"2026-09-29T10:17:13.687","source":"NVD","sourceUrl":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-91012","references":[{"url":"https://lists.apache.org/thread/op8trtz1qxkdwj2rjozhd9yt2yd6nhw4","label":"security@apache.org"},{"url":"http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/28/8","label":"af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108"}],"tags":["nvd","cve.org"],"ingestedAt":"2026-09-29T09:30:49.080Z","slug":"CVE-2026-91012","body":"## Overview\n\norg.apache.karaf.config.core.impl.ConfigRepositoryImpl#update(pid, properties),\nwhich backs the \"config\" MBean and the config:* shell commands, derives the file\nit writes a configuration to from caller-supplied input without checking that\nthe result stays inside ${karaf.etc}:\n\n  *  if the submitted property map contains a felix.fileinstall.filename entry, that value is turned directly into a File (getCfgFileFromProperty), so it can point to any absolute path the Karaf process can write to;\n  *  otherwise the configuration PID is concatenated verbatim into the target file name (generateConfigFilename(): new File(karaf.etc, pid + \".cfg\")), so a PID containing \"..\" segments resolves outside ${karaf.etc}. createFactoryConfiguration() has the same issue via the factory PID/alias.\n\n\nBoth code paths are reachable by any caller holding the \"manager\" role under Karaf's shipped command/JMX ACL (org.apache.karaf.command.acl.conf.cfg: \"update = manager\"). Such a user can therefore write attacker-controlled content to any file the Karaf process can write, including files the same ACL otherwise reserves to \"admin\" (etc/users.properties, etc/*.acl.*.cfg, etc/org.apache.karaf.management.cfg, and similar), allowing a manager-role user to grant themselves the admin role or otherwise take over the container.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nConfigMBeanImpl.install() and the config:install shell command already guarded the equivalent risk on their own code path with a finalname.contains(\"..\") string check, but that check does not stop absolute paths or symlink-based escapes, and it was never applied to ConfigRepositoryImpl.update() / createFactoryConfiguration() at all.\n\n## Remediation\n\nRefer to the linked advisories for vendor-supplied fixes and affected version ranges.","depth":"sunlit","depthScore":3,"depthScoreParts":{"impact":2.8,"likelihood":0,"exploitation":0,"ransomware":0},"changes":[]}