{"id":"CVE-2026-85243","title":"Apache Camel: Camel-Crypto-PGP Integrity Verification Downgrade via Attacker-Controlled Message Structure","summary":"Improper Validation of Integrity Check Value vulnerability in Apache Camel Crypto PGP component.\n\nThis issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.18.5, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.1.\n\nunmarshal() verified the modification detection code…","severity":"medium","cvss":5.9,"cvssVector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N","cvssSource":"cna","cwe":["CWE-354"],"vendor":"Apache Software Foundation","product":"org.apache.camel:camel-crypto-pgp","affected":["org.apache.camel:camel-crypto-pgp >= 4.0.0 < 4.18.5","org.apache.camel:camel-crypto-pgp >= 4.19.0 < 4.22.1"],"published":"2026-10-19","updated":"2026-10-19","sourceUpdated":"2026-10-19T10:32:21.246Z","source":"CVEORG","sourceUrl":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-85243","references":[{"url":"https://camel.apache.org/security/CVE-2026-85243.html","label":"Apache Camel Security Advisory - CVE-2026-85243"},{"url":"https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/CAMEL-24441","label":"CAMEL-24441"},{"url":"https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/25848","label":"Fix on main, released in 4.23.0 (commit 9d3108def6e8344f65a70ee86832b8f5237bc82d)"},{"url":"https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/25944","label":"Backport to camel-4.22.x, released in 4.22.1 (commit 95b4c1500001bc32877df5b8fca0bc7bdd080666)"},{"url":"https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/25946","label":"Backport to camel-4.18.x, released in 4.18.5 (commit 4ec9b37d70b08c478966000fb1bd653abfe410e3)"}],"tags":["cve.org"],"ingestedAt":"2026-10-19T12:27:23.816Z","slug":"CVE-2026-85243","body":"## Overview\n\nImproper Validation of Integrity Check Value vulnerability in Apache Camel Crypto PGP component.\n\nThis issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.18.5, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.1.\n\nunmarshal() verified the modification detection code only when the message was an OpenPGP symmetrically encrypted integrity protected data packet. The older symmetrically encrypted data packet carries no such code, and OpenPGP's CFB mode is malleable without one, so a message using that packet skipped the check altogether. The packet type is chosen by whoever produced the message, which left the sender - or anyone able to rewrite the message in transit - deciding whether the integrity check applied at all. The existing integrity option governs marshalling only and had no decrypt-side counterpart, so a deployment could not require integrity protection on the messages it accepted.\n\nUpgrade to Apache Camel 4.23.0, which fixes the issue. Users on the 4.18.x LTS releases stream should upgrade to 4.18.5. Users on the 4.22.x LTS releases stream should upgrade to 4.22.1. A requireIntegrityProtection option, defaulting to true, now rejects a message that is not integrity protected. Note that signatureVerificationOption still defaults to optional, so a message carrying no signature is accepted; the two options together are what give a decrypted message authenticity and not only confidentiality. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, reject messages that do not use the integrity protected packet before they reach the data format. Routes that must interoperate with a sender still emitting the legacy packet should set requireIntegrityProtection=false after upgrading, and treat the decrypted content as unauthenticated.\n\n## Affected\n\n- `org.apache.camel:camel-crypto-pgp >= 4.0.0 < 4.18.5`\n- `org.apache.camel:camel-crypto-pgp >= 4.19.0 < 4.22.1`\n\n## Remediation\n\nUpgrade to Apache Camel 4.23.0, which fixes the issue. Users on the 4.18.x LTS releases stream should upgrade to 4.18.5. Users on the 4.22.x LTS releases stream should upgrade to 4.22.1. A requireIntegrityProtection option, defaulting to true, now rejects a message that is not integrity protected. Note that signatureVerificationOption still defaults to optional, so a message carrying no signature is accepted; the two options together are what give a decrypted message authenticity and not only confidentiality.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nFor deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, reject messages that do not use the integrity protected packet before they reach the data format. Routes that must interoperate with a sender still emitting the legacy packet should set requireIntegrityProtection=false after upgrading, and treat the decrypted content as unauthenticated.","depth":"sunlit","depthScore":32,"depthScoreParts":{"impact":32.5,"likelihood":0,"exploitation":0,"ransomware":0},"changes":[]}