{"id":"CVE-2026-81730","title":"Dolibarr 9.0.0 through 23.0.4 Path Traversal via EmailCollector Attachment Filename","summary":"Dolibarr 9.0.0 through 23.0.4 saves inbound email attachments under the name supplied in the message's MIME headers without reducing it to a safe basename. The global saveAttachment() in htdocs/emailcollector/lib/emailcollector.lib.php b…","severity":"high","cvss":8.2,"cvssVector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L","cvssSource":"cna","cwe":["CWE-22"],"vendor":"Dolibarr","product":"dolibarr","affected":["dolibarr >= 9.0.0 < 24.0.0"],"ssvc":{"exploitation":"none","automatable":"yes","technicalImpact":"partial","timestamp":"2026-08-28T17:54:28.936858Z"},"published":"2026-08-27","updated":"2026-09-24","sourceUpdated":"2026-09-24T14:19:50.025Z","source":"CVEORG","sourceUrl":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-81730","references":[{"url":"https://github.com/Dolibarr/dolibarr/commit/264a44defb5e438689c75679617f6edc4c038abc","label":"Patch Commit"},{"url":"https://github.com/Dolibarr/dolibarr"},{"url":"https://github.com/Dolibarr/dolibarr/blob/23.0.4/htdocs/emailcollector/lib/emailcollector.lib.php#L187"},{"url":"https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/dolibarr-9.0.0-through-23.0.4-path-traversal-via-emailcollector-attachment-filename","label":"VulnCheck Advisory: Dolibarr 9.0.0 through 23.0.4 Path Traversal via EmailCollector Attachment Filename"}],"tags":["cve.org"],"epss":0.00561,"epssPercentile":0.44266,"ingestedAt":"2026-09-24T15:45:56.696Z","slug":"CVE-2026-81730","body":"## Overview\n\nDolibarr 9.0.0 through 23.0.4 saves inbound email attachments under the name supplied in the message's MIME headers without reducing it to a safe basename. The global saveAttachment() in htdocs/emailcollector/lib/emailcollector.lib.php builds $filepath = $path . $filename . '.' . $ext and hands it to file_put_contents(), and the private saveAttachment() in htdocs/emailcollector/class/emailcollector.class.php writes to $destdir.'/'.$filename; the name reaches both from the attachment's own getName() or getFilename() value by way of the record-join, create-ticket and create-project operations. A traversal sequence in the filename therefore survives intact, so any sender who can email a mailbox that an EmailCollector monitors, which is the module's ordinary use for a support or ticket inbox, can place attacker-controlled content outside the per-object attachment directory without holding a Dolibarr account. Under the hardened layout Dolibarr's SECURITY.md requires, with htdocs read-only, the write is confined to the documents tree and corrupts or forges other objects' documents; where htdocs is writable the same primitive reaches a web-executable path. Version 24.0.0 applies dol_sanitizePathName() and dol_sanitizeFileName() before the write.\n\n## Affected\n\n- `dolibarr >= 9.0.0 < 24.0.0`\n\n## Remediation\n\nRefer to the linked advisories for vendor-supplied fixes and affected version ranges.","depth":"twilight","depthScore":45,"depthScoreParts":{"impact":45.1,"likelihood":0.1,"exploitation":0,"ransomware":0},"changes":[]}