{"id":"CVE-2026-81568","title":"Joomla Extension - j2commerce.com - Arbitrary file read via `task=download` in J2Store 1.0.0-3.3.2, 4.0.0-4.0.22, 4.1.0-4.1.7 - `J2StoreModelOrderdownloads::getFilePath()` built the on-disk path to a purchased digital download by concate…","summary":"Joomla Extension - j2commerce.com - Arbitrary file read via `task=download` in J2Store 1.0.0-3.3.2, 4.0.0-4.0.22, 4.1.0-4.1.7 - `J2StoreModelOrderdownloads::getFilePath()` built the on-disk path to a purchased digital download by concate…","severity":"high","cvss":8.7,"cvssVector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","cwe":["CWE-22"],"vendor":"j2commerce.com","product":"J2Store extension for Joomla","affected":["j2store_extension_for_joomla 1.0.0-3.3.22","j2store_extension_for_joomla 4.0.0-4.0.22","j2store_extension_for_joomla 4.1.0-4.1.7"],"published":"2026-09-15","updated":"2026-09-16","sourceUpdated":"2026-09-16T19:28:06.713","source":"NVD","sourceUrl":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-81568","references":[{"url":"https://www.j2commerce.com/","label":"security@joomla.org"}],"tags":["nvd","cve.org"],"ssvc":{"exploitation":"none","automatable":"yes","technicalImpact":"partial","timestamp":"2026-09-15T19:29:28.406527Z"},"cvssSource":"cna","ingestedAt":"2026-09-15T19:42:58.808Z","epss":0.00331,"epssPercentile":0.26455,"slug":"CVE-2026-81568","body":"## Overview\n\nJoomla Extension - j2commerce.com - Arbitrary file read via `task=download` in J2Store 1.0.0-3.3.2, 4.0.0-4.0.22, 4.1.0-4.1.7 - `J2StoreModelOrderdownloads::getFilePath()` built the on-disk path to a purchased digital download by concatenating the configured attachment folder with the product file's stored `product_file_save_name`, using only `JPath::clean()` (which normalises separators but does not resolve or reject `..` segments) and a plain `JFile::exists()` check — never confirming the resolved path stayed inside the configured attachment folder. If a product file's `product_file_save_name` ever contained a `../` traversal segment — most plausibly via the CSRF-forgeable admin product-file save actions described in Issue 1, but equally by any future integration or bug that writes that field — any customer holding a valid download `token`/`pid` pair for that product file could have the traversal resolve to a path outside the attachment folder and download any file readable by the web server (e.g. `configuration.php`).\n\n## Remediation\n\nRefer to the linked advisories for vendor-supplied fixes and affected version ranges.","depth":"twilight","depthScore":48,"depthScoreParts":{"impact":47.8,"likelihood":0.1,"exploitation":0,"ransomware":0},"changes":[]}