{"id":"CVE-2026-80663","title":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ntools/power/x86/intel-speed-select: Harden daemon pidfile open\n\nAvoid symlink-based pidfile clobbering by opening the pidfile with\nO_NOFOLLOW and validating it with fst…","summary":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ntools/power/x86/intel-speed-select: Harden daemon pidfile open\n\nAvoid symlink-based pidfile clobbering by opening the pidfile with\nO_NOFOLLOW and validating it with fst…","severity":"high","cvss":7.1,"cvssVector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H","published":"2026-08-28","updated":"2026-08-29","source":"NVD","sourceUrl":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80663","references":[{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/19ffeb30fdfce63f8d6aca71bcdddb3f69d46278","label":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/607af438e6430893a822964c841a1994b33acccc","label":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/72a07abc6b9046f07a08bba353cad7667bcc9dce","label":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/905493a6338c82a70da16f86e0a6215db5a3d73d","label":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/db938eb9a3c1317596c28e94413b33426508d51b","label":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e8adac69d1bdf035ef97cc914e845acd4ef08e28","label":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"}],"tags":["nvd"],"epss":0.00126,"epssPercentile":0.02627,"ingestedAt":"2026-08-30T04:47:09.832Z","slug":"CVE-2026-80663","body":"## Overview\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ntools/power/x86/intel-speed-select: Harden daemon pidfile open\n\nAvoid symlink-based pidfile clobbering by opening the pidfile with\nO_NOFOLLOW and validating it with fstat() before locking/writing.\n\nThe daemon currently uses a fixed pidfile path under /tmp. A local\nunprivileged user can pre-create a symlink at that path and cause a\nroot-run daemon instance to write into an attacker-chosen file.\n\n## Remediation\n\nRefer to the linked advisories for vendor-supplied fixes and affected version ranges.","depth":"twilight","depthScore":39,"depthScoreParts":{"impact":39.1,"likelihood":0,"exploitation":0,"ransomware":0},"changes":[]}