{"id":"CVE-2026-77814","title":"is_path_trusted in scripts/iib/api.py compares the requested path against each allowed parent directory with path.startswith(parent_path), without appending a path separator","summary":"is_path_trusted in scripts/iib/api.py compares the requested path against each allowed parent directory with path.startswith(parent_path), without appending a path separator. A directory whose name merely begins with an allowed path ther…","severity":"high","cvss":7.5,"cvssVector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N","cwe":["CWE-22"],"vendor":"zanllp","product":"infinite-image-browsing","affected":["infinite-image-browsing <= 1.8.0"],"published":"2026-08-21","updated":"2026-09-24","sourceUpdated":"2026-09-24T20:06:30.133","source":"NVD","sourceUrl":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-77814","references":[{"url":"https://github.com/zanllp/infinite-image-browsing","label":"disclosure@vulncheck.com"},{"url":"https://github.com/zanllp/infinite-image-browsing/blob/v1.8.0/scripts/iib/api.py#L329-L344","label":"disclosure@vulncheck.com"},{"url":"https://github.com/zanllp/infinite-image-browsing/commit/4057a624c7a23a36f0b4dc6a545b40767d602450","label":"disclosure@vulncheck.com"},{"url":"https://github.com/zanllp/infinite-image-browsing/issues/968","label":"disclosure@vulncheck.com"},{"url":"https://github.com/zanllp/infinite-image-browsing/pull/969","label":"disclosure@vulncheck.com"},{"url":"https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/infinite-image-browsing-is-path-trusted-prefix-comparison-omits-the-trailing-path-separator","label":"disclosure@vulncheck.com"},{"url":"https://github.com/zanllp/infinite-image-browsing/issues/968","label":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0"}],"tags":["nvd","cve.org","exploit-available"],"epss":0.00596,"epssPercentile":0.46143,"exploitAvailable":true,"ssvc":{"exploitation":"poc","automatable":"yes","technicalImpact":"partial","timestamp":"2026-08-21T17:33:19.983444Z"},"ingestedAt":"2026-09-24T15:45:56.698Z","slug":"CVE-2026-77814","body":"## Overview\n\nis_path_trusted in scripts/iib/api.py compares the requested path against each allowed parent directory with path.startswith(parent_path), without appending a path separator. A directory whose name merely begins with an allowed path therefore satisfies the comparison, so where /data/images is allowed a request for /data/images_private/secret.txt is treated as trusted and served by FileResponse, disclosing files the confinement was meant to exclude. Whether the check applies depends on get_enable_access_control in scripts/iib/tool.py: it returns true when IIB_ACCESS_CONTROL is set to enable, false when set to disable, and otherwise true when the host Stable Diffusion WebUI was started with share, ngrok, listen or server_name, falling back to false. Confinement is therefore active in the network-exposed WebUI deployments that rely on it, while a standalone run with no such option serves every readable file regardless of this flaw. The fix compares against parent_path joined with os.sep.\n\n## Remediation\n\nRefer to the linked advisories for vendor-supplied fixes and affected version ranges.","depth":"midnight","depthScore":53,"depthScoreParts":{"impact":41.3,"likelihood":0.1,"exploitation":12,"ransomware":0},"changes":[]}