{"id":"CVE-2026-76237","aliases":["GHSA-xhv3-q4xx-349r"],"title":"stistigmem-node: quarantine review surface exposes and mutates other tenants' quarantined facts (cross-tenant BOLA)","summary":"stistigmem-node: quarantine review surface exposes and mutates other tenants' quarantined facts (cross-tenant BOLA)","severity":"high","vendor":"stigmem-node","product":"stigmem-node","ecosystem":"pip","affected":["stigmem-node < 0.9.0a12"],"patched":["stigmem-node 0.9.0a12"],"published":"2026-06-19","updated":"2026-08-20","source":"OSV","sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-xhv3-q4xx-349r","references":[{"url":"https://github.com/eidetic-labs/stigmem/security/advisories/GHSA-xhv3-q4xx-349r"},{"url":"https://github.com/eidetic-labs/stigmem/pull/728"},{"url":"https://github.com/eidetic-labs/stigmem"}],"tags":["osv","pip"],"epss":0.0029,"epssPercentile":0.21751,"ingestedAt":"2026-08-20T19:23:07.108Z","slug":"CVE-2026-76237","body":"## Overview\n\n### Summary\nOn a multi-tenant stigmem node, a tenant administrator could list, read, and **admit or reject** quarantined facts belonging to **other** tenants. The list/count queries and `_get_quarantined_fact` in `routes/quarantine.py` lacked an `f.tenant_id = identity.tenant_id` predicate, and the garden lookup was not tenant-scoped — reached via the `/v1/quarantine` list and admit/reject endpoints.\n\n### Impact\nCross-tenant confidentiality (reading another tenant's quarantined content) and cross-tenant integrity (moderating — admitting or rejecting — another tenant's facts), gated only by a plain tenant `write` capability rather than a node-level admin authority.\n\n### Affected configurations\nThis is a cross-**tenant** break. It is exploitable **only** on deployments running the opt-in `stigmem-plugin-multi-tenant` (multiple tenants on one node). A default single-tenant node has only `tenant=\"default\"` — there is no second tenant to cross — so it is **not exploitable** on default deployments. The rating is HIGH for the multi-tenant deployments the plugin exists to isolate.\n\n### Patches\nFixed in `0.9.0a12` (PR #728): `AND f.tenant_id = identity.tenant_id` was added to the list/count queries and `_get_quarantined_fact`; the garden lookup is now tenant-scoped; and any genuinely cross-tenant moderation is gated behind `can_admin_federation()` (node superadmin), not a tenant `write` capability. A tenant-B admin can no longer list, admit, or reject tenant-A's quarantined facts.\n\n### Workarounds\nNone other than upgrading to `0.9.0a12`. Single-tenant deployments are unaffected.\n\n## Affected packages\n\n- `stigmem-node < 0.9.0a12`\n\n## Remediation\n\nUpgrade to a patched release:\n\n- `stigmem-node 0.9.0a12`","depth":"twilight","depthScore":41,"depthScoreParts":{"impact":41.3,"likelihood":0.1,"exploitation":0,"ransomware":0},"changes":[]}