{"id":"CVE-2026-74671","title":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nima: fix out-of-bounds read in xattr_verify()\n\nThe digest-length check in xattr_verify() mixes int and size_t:\n\n\tif (xattr_len - sizeof(xattr_value->type) - hash_start …","summary":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nima: fix out-of-bounds read in xattr_verify()\n\nThe digest-length check in xattr_verify() mixes int and size_t:\n\n\tif (xattr_len - sizeof(xattr_value->type) - hash_start …","severity":"none","published":"2026-08-22","updated":"2026-10-14","sourceUpdated":"2026-10-14T13:10:00.187","source":"NVD","sourceUrl":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74671","references":[{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/27f3924061592d0ef6b04e16f48754b6cb6adf27","label":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5ff232d31106f45ac87c3b64e1d35a0667777797","label":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7e515b6c9aab452a4f0734bd7208e4e780e164ca","label":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a784b4732ac7e51862b9b210c2d8b2ab9e83568c","label":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b6cb134707a2127d90a58d69dd818679cae8033c","label":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/caeb105c15ea2431fa8da7ecfa242d0c68272426","label":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d823b5f4557083d1dd92096f796a78a2b1b06d10","label":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dd04114af0d451091f7b8cbd26d9e37d011e9131","label":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"}],"tags":["nvd"],"epss":0.00177,"epssPercentile":0.06723,"ingestedAt":"2026-10-14T13:30:58.533Z","slug":"CVE-2026-74671","body":"## Overview\n\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nima: fix out-of-bounds read in xattr_verify()\n\nThe digest-length check in xattr_verify() mixes int and size_t:\n\n\tif (xattr_len - sizeof(xattr_value->type) - hash_start >=\n\t\t\tiint->ima_hash->length)\n\nsizeof() yields size_t, so the usual arithmetic conversions promote\nthe whole left-hand side to unsigned 64-bit before the subtraction\nruns. For a truncated xattr this underflows instead of going negative:\na 1-byte IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG xattr (xattr_len == 1, hash_start == 1)\nturns \"1 - 1 - 1\" into SIZE_MAX, which is trivially >= ima_hash->length.\nThe check then passes and the following memcmp() reads\niint->ima_hash->length bytes starting past the end of the buffer\nvfs_getxattr_alloc() allocated for it.\n\nNothing upstream clamps xattr_len back into a safe range first:\nima_get_hash_algo() only special-cases xattr_len < 2 to pick a default\nalgorithm, and evm_verifyxattr() returns INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN rather than\nfailing when no HMAC key is loaded, so a truncated security.ima value\nreaches the length check as-is.\n\nRewrite the comparison so every operand stays a signed int and no\nimplicit conversion to size_t can occur.\n\n## Remediation\n\nRefer to the linked advisories for vendor-supplied fixes and affected version ranges.","depth":"sunlit","depthScore":3,"depthScoreParts":{"impact":2.8,"likelihood":0,"exploitation":0,"ransomware":0},"changes":[]}