{"id":"CVE-2026-60091","aliases":["GHSA-4w49-gwv8-fpjg"],"title":"PraisonAI: Jobs API is unauthenticated by default and allows attacker-controlled webhook SSRF","summary":"PraisonAI: Jobs API is unauthenticated by default and allows attacker-controlled webhook SSRF","severity":"high","cvss":7.2,"cwe":["CWE-200","CWE-306","CWE-367","CWE-918"],"vendor":"praisonai","product":"praisonai","ecosystem":"pip","affected":["praisonai <= 4.6.77"],"patched":["praisonai 4.6.78"],"published":"2026-10-08","updated":"2026-10-08","sourceUpdated":"2026-10-08T21:57:57Z","source":"GHSA","sourceUrl":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-4w49-gwv8-fpjg","references":[{"url":"https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-4w49-gwv8-fpjg"},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-60091"},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-62175"},{"url":"https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/praisonai-before-unauthenticated-ssrf-via-webhook-url"},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-4w49-gwv8-fpjg"}],"tags":["ghsa","pip"],"epss":0.00301,"epssPercentile":0.209,"ingestedAt":"2026-10-08T22:11:53.881Z","slug":"CVE-2026-60091","body":"## Overview\n\n## Summary\n\nPraisonAI's Async Jobs API enables its API-key middleware **only when `PRAISONAI_JOBS_API_KEY` is set**, so by default every endpoint is unauthenticated. An unauthenticated `POST /api/v1/runs` accepts an attacker-controlled `webhook_url`; on job completion the server POSTs the job payload to it via `httpx`. The `webhook_url` has an SSRF validator (`gethostbyname` + private-IP check), but it validates at request time while `httpx` re-resolves at connection time — a DNS-rebinding TOCTOU that reaches internal services. Runtime-confirmed as an **unauthenticated, blind** SSRF (the internal canary received the POST; the internal response is not returned to the attacker). Severity Medium.\n\n## Details\n\n### Affected component\n- Package: `praisonai` 4.6.63. Files: `src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/server.py`, `jobs/router.py`, `jobs/executor.py`, `jobs/models.py`.\n\n### Vulnerable code / root cause\n\nPath:\n`src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/server.py`\n\nFunction:\n`create_app`\n\nSnippet:\n```python\njobs_api_key = os.environ.get(\"PRAISONAI_JOBS_API_KEY\")\n# ...\nif jobs_api_key:\n    app.add_middleware(JobsAPIKeyMiddleware)   # auth ONLY when env var is set\n```\nIssue: with the env var unset (default), no auth middleware is added → all endpoints unauthenticated. Default bind is `127.0.0.1`.\n\nPath:\n`src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/router.py`\n\nFunction:\n`submit_job`\n\nSnippet:\n```python\n@router.post(\"\", response_model=JobSubmitResponse, status_code=202)\nasync def submit_job(request, response, body: JobSubmitRequest, ...):\n    # no auth dependency; body.webhook_url is attacker-controlled\n    job = Job(prompt=body.prompt, webhook_url=body.webhook_url, ...)\n    await executor.submit(job)\n```\nIssue: attacker-controlled `webhook_url` flows into the job with no authentication on the endpoint.\n\nPath:\n`src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/models.py` (validator) and `src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/executor.py` (sink)\n\nFunction:\n`validate_webhook_url` → `_send_webhook`\n\nSnippet:\n```python\n# models.py validate_webhook_url (CHECK time)\nip = socket.gethostbyname(hostname)\nif ipaddress.ip_address(ip).is_private or ...:\n    raise ValueError(\"Webhook URL resolves to a private or restricted network address\")\n\n# executor.py _send_webhook (CONNECT time, re-resolves, no pinning)\nasync with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=30.0) as client:\n    response = await client.post(job.webhook_url, json=payload, ...)\n```\nIssue: the validator resolves the hostname at validation time but does not pin the IP for the `httpx.post` connection → DNS rebinding (independent resolution at check vs connect) bypasses it and reaches internal services.\n\n### Attack flow\n1. Operator runs the Jobs API without `PRAISONAI_JOBS_API_KEY` (default → unauth).\n2. Attacker `POST /api/v1/runs` with `webhook_url` = a rebinding domain.\n3. The validator(s) see a public IP (pass); on completion `httpx.post` re-resolves to an internal IP and connects → SSRF to internal.\n\n### Why existing protection is bypassed\nAuth is opt-in (only when the env var is set). The `webhook_url` validator resolves at check time but does not pin the IP for the connection → DNS-rebinding TOCTOU. (Correction to an earlier static note: the guard exists but is bypassable.)\n\n### Security boundary\nUnauthenticated network peer → server-side request to internal services (Scope: Changed). Default bind `127.0.0.1` limits remote reach unless the operator binds non-loopback.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n### Environment\nReal Jobs API (`python -m praisonai.jobs.server`, no API key) in a local runtime (`127.0.0.1:18085`), resolver pointed at the controlled rebinding DNS, internal canary Docker-internal only. Runnable assets: `PraisonAI-Runtime-Repro\\runtime-files\\` (`docker-compose.jobs.yml`).\n\n### Steps to reproduce\n1. `PRAI-04-01-Jobs-Submit-NoAuth`: `POST /api/v1/runs {\"prompt\":\"hello\"}` → `202` (no auth).\n2. `PRAI-04-02-Jobs-Webhook-SSRF-Blind`: `POST /api/v1/runs {\"prompt\":\"hello\",\"webhook_url\":\"http://rebind.lab:8081/secret\"}` → `202`.\n\n### Expected result\nUnauthenticated job submission should be rejected; the webhook SSRF guard should prevent reaching internal services regardless of DNS timing.\n\n## Impact\nUnauthenticated job submission (LLM cost abuse); SSRF to internal services (blind, DNS-rebinding); exfiltration of the job result to an attacker-controlled webhook.\n\n## Suggested remediation\n- Authenticate the Jobs API by default (auto-generate a token / fail closed when binding non-loopback), like the gateway.\n- For `webhook_url`: resolve once, reject private/loopback/CGNAT/metadata, then pin and connect to the validated IP; disable redirects.\n\n## Affected packages\n\n- `praisonai <= 4.6.77`\n\n## Remediation\n\nUpgrade to a patched release:\n\n- `praisonai 4.6.78`","depth":"twilight","depthScore":40,"depthScoreParts":{"impact":39.6,"likelihood":0.1,"exploitation":0,"ransomware":0},"changes":[]}