{"id":"CVE-2026-59226","aliases":["GHSA-mvx4-532p-xfm9"],"title":"Open WebUI: Scheduled automations continue after pending-user deactivation and stored model ACL revocation","summary":"Open WebUI: Scheduled automations continue after pending-user deactivation and stored model ACL revocation","severity":"low","cvss":3.1,"cwe":["CWE-285","CWE-862","CWE-863"],"vendor":"open-webui","product":"open-webui","ecosystem":"pip","affected":["open-webui >= 0.9.0, < 0.10.0"],"patched":["open-webui 0.10.0"],"published":"2026-07-24","updated":"2026-07-24","source":"GHSA","sourceUrl":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mvx4-532p-xfm9","references":[{"url":"https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-mvx4-532p-xfm9"},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59226"},{"url":"https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/pull/26047"},{"url":"https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/commit/920b655f4689e2118de928fbc936f6ebd4fed396"},{"url":"https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/releases/tag/v0.10.0"},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mvx4-532p-xfm9"}],"tags":["ghsa","pip"],"epss":0.00303,"epssPercentile":0.23248,"ingestedAt":"2026-07-24T17:34:27.385Z","slug":"CVE-2026-59226","body":"## Overview\n\n**Title:** Scheduled automations continue after pending-user deactivation and stored model ACL revocation\n\n### Summary\n\nOpen WebUI documents `pending` as a zero-access role used for new sign-ups and deactivated users, and normal HTTP routes enforce that with `get_verified_user()` (which rejects `pending`), while automation create/update/run routes additionally require the `features.automations` permission. Two paths missed that lifecycle gate, so a deactivated (`pending`) account could keep acting through the background automation scheduler:\n\n1. **Scheduler did not re-gate the owner.** When a stored automation became due, `execute_automation()` rehydrated the owner with `Users.get_user_by_id(...)` and re-entered the chat completion pipeline without re-checking that the owner was still `user`/`admin` or still held `features.automations`. A still-active automation therefore kept running after its owner was deactivated.\n2. **Model ACL only enforced for exact role `user`.** `check_model_access()` applied private-model grants only when `user.role == \"user\"`, so a `pending` principal fell through a branch that denies a normal non-owner `user`.\n\nNet effect: a deactivated account could continue scheduled chat generation through the background worker, consuming the operator's configured model-provider credentials and reaching a stored automation model ID that its current role/ACL state would no longer permit through normal routes.\n\n### Impact\n\nA `pending`/deactivated account continues to execute due scheduled automations after its access has been revoked, consuming the operator's provider credentials, quota and shared capacity, and bypassing the private-model ACL for the automation's stored model ID. Exploitation requires a previously created active automation and a later transition to `pending` (deactivation or approval rollback), so it is bounded and not interactive. It does not grant unauthenticated access, account takeover, code execution, or cross-user data exfiltration.\n\n### Patched\n\nIn 0.10.0:\n\n- `execute_automation()` aborts and records an error unless the rehydrated owner is still `user` or `admin` and (for non-admins) still holds `features.automations`, so a deactivated or de-permissioned owner's due automation no longer runs.\n- `check_model_access()` enforces model ACLs for every non-admin role rather than only the exact role `user`, so a `pending` or otherwise unrecognised role no longer falls through.\n\n### Credits\n\n@rexpository\n\n## Affected packages\n\n- `open-webui >= 0.9.0, < 0.10.0`\n\n## Remediation\n\nUpgrade to a patched release:\n\n- `open-webui 0.10.0`","depth":"sunlit","depthScore":17,"depthScoreParts":{"impact":17.1,"likelihood":0.1,"exploitation":0,"ransomware":0},"changes":[]}