{"id":"CVE-2026-59219","aliases":["GHSA-855v-hq7w-jmjw"],"title":"Open WebUI: Realtime endpoints accept Redis-revoked JWTs after signout/backchannel logout","summary":"Open WebUI: Realtime endpoints accept Redis-revoked JWTs after signout/backchannel logout","severity":"high","cvss":7.1,"cwe":["CWE-613"],"vendor":"open-webui","product":"open-webui","ecosystem":"pip","affected":["open-webui >= 0.9.0, < 0.10.0"],"patched":["open-webui 0.10.0"],"published":"2026-07-24","updated":"2026-07-24","source":"GHSA","sourceUrl":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-855v-hq7w-jmjw","references":[{"url":"https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-855v-hq7w-jmjw"},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59219"},{"url":"https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/commit/33b91bd8ae8a100a5a306c91441a7d0b422c4cde"},{"url":"https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/releases/tag/v0.10.0"},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-855v-hq7w-jmjw"}],"tags":["ghsa","pip"],"epss":0.00456,"epssPercentile":0.3687,"ingestedAt":"2026-07-24T17:34:27.287Z","slug":"CVE-2026-59219","body":"## Overview\n\n## Summary\n\nWith Redis configured, Open WebUI supports JWT revocation: `POST /api/v1/auths/signout` (per-token `jti`) and OIDC back-channel logout (per-user `revoked_at`) record revocations in Redis, and HTTP auth (`get_current_user`) rejects revoked tokens with 401. The realtime authentication surfaces do not perform this check: Socket.IO connect / user-join / join-channels / join-note and the terminal websocket first-message auth validate tokens with `decode_token()` only (signature + expiry). A JWT revoked by sign-out or back-channel logout therefore continues to authenticate new realtime connections, even though the same token is rejected on HTTP.\n\n## Affected component\n\n- `backend/open_webui/socket/main.py` — Socket.IO `connect`, `user-join`, `join-channels`, `join-note`\n- `backend/open_webui/routers/terminals.py` — terminal websocket first-message auth\n- `backend/open_webui/utils/auth.py` — the revocation check was applied to HTTP only\n\n## Root cause\n\nHTTP auth enforces revocation:\n\n```python\n# utils/auth.py — get_current_user\nif data.get('jti') and not await is_valid_token(request, data):\n    raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail='Invalid token')\n```\n\nRealtime auth calls `decode_token()` only, which verifies signature + expiry but never consults the Redis revocation keys (`{prefix}:auth:token:{jti}:revoked`, `{prefix}:auth:user:{id}:revoked_at`):\n\n```python\n# socket/main.py — connect / user-join / join-channels / join-note\ndata = decode_token(auth['token'])\n# routers/terminals.py — _resolve_authenticated_connection\ndata = decode_token(token)\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nA JWT revoked by user sign-out or OIDC back-channel logout still authenticates new realtime connections. A stolen token therefore retains realtime access after the victim signs out or the IdP performs back-channel logout — the very remediation for a compromised token. The token can populate `SESSION_POOL` as the victim, join their user/channel/note rooms (receiving realtime channel messages, collaborative-note updates and presence), drive socket-level collaboration as the victim, and pass terminal websocket authentication when terminal servers are configured. HTTP remains correctly protected (401), so REST data and state-changing REST endpoints are not reachable with the revoked token.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nReporter PoC on a Redis-backed deployment (v0.9.6 and main): after `POST /api/v1/auths/signout`, HTTP returns 401 for the token while a Socket.IO user-join with the same token still authenticates, and the terminal WS reaches terminal-server lookup rather than rejecting it as `Invalid token`.\n\n## Fix\n\nApply the revocation check on the realtime paths. The logic is factored into `is_token_revoked(redis, decoded)` (covering per-token `jti` and per-user `revoked_at`); the Socket.IO handlers and the terminal WS reject tokens that fail it, using the main app Redis where revocations are stored. HTTP `is_valid_token` delegates to the same helper, so HTTP behaviour is unchanged.\n\n## Affected / Patched\n\n- Affected: `>= 0.9.0, < 0.10.0`, and only when Redis is configured (without Redis, per-token revocation is not supported and sign-out does not invalidate JWTs by design).\n- Patched: v0.10.0. The revocation check (`is_valid_token`, covering per-token `jti` and per-user `revoked_at`) is applied on Socket.IO connect / user-join / join-channels / join-note and the terminal websocket first-message auth, using the main app Redis where revocations are stored. HTTP `is_valid_token` delegates to the same logic, so HTTP behaviour is unchanged.\n\n## Affected packages\n\n- `open-webui >= 0.9.0, < 0.10.0`\n\n## Remediation\n\nUpgrade to a patched release:\n\n- `open-webui 0.10.0`","depth":"twilight","depthScore":39,"depthScoreParts":{"impact":39.1,"likelihood":0.1,"exploitation":0,"ransomware":0},"changes":[]}