{"id":"CVE-2026-57573","aliases":["GHSA-wm69-2pc3-rmmf"],"title":"Crawl4AI: Unauthenticated SSRF on the Docker server streaming crawl path (/crawl/stream)","summary":"Crawl4AI: Unauthenticated SSRF on the Docker server streaming crawl path (/crawl/stream)","severity":"high","cvss":8.6,"cvssVector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N","vendor":"crawl4ai","product":"crawl4ai","ecosystem":"pip","affected":["crawl4ai < 0.9.0"],"patched":["crawl4ai 0.9.0"],"published":"2026-06-18","updated":"2026-07-08","source":"OSV","sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-wm69-2pc3-rmmf","references":[{"url":"https://github.com/unclecode/crawl4ai/security/advisories/GHSA-wm69-2pc3-rmmf"},{"url":"https://github.com/unclecode/crawl4ai"}],"tags":["osv","pip"],"epss":0.00445,"epssPercentile":0.38112,"ingestedAt":"2026-07-08T18:25:53.844Z","slug":"CVE-2026-57573","body":"## Overview\n\n### Summary\n\nThe Docker API server applied its SSRF destination check (`validate_url_destination`) on the non-streaming `/crawl` path but not on the streaming path. `handle_stream_crawl_request` passed seed URLs straight to the crawler with no destination validation. A remote, unauthenticated client could call `POST /crawl/stream` (or `POST /crawl` with `crawler_config.stream=true`, which short-circuits to the same handler) with a URL pointing at an internal, private, or link-local address; the server fetched it and streamed the response body back. The Docker API is unauthenticated by default.\n\n### Affected paths\n\n`POST /crawl/stream`, and `POST /crawl` with `crawler_config.stream=true` (both route to `handle_stream_crawl_request`, `deploy/docker/api.py`).\n\n### Impact\n\nUnauthenticated read server-side request forgery: an attacker reads internal-only services and cloud-metadata endpoints (e.g. `http://169.254.169.254/` for IAM credentials), with the response body streamed back. This is the same class and severity as the project's prior \"SSRF via Direct Crawl Endpoints\" advisory; `/crawl/stream` is part of that endpoint family and was never covered by the destination check.\n\n### Fix\n\n`handle_stream_crawl_request` now validates every seed URL's destination with the same global-routability check as `handle_crawl_request`, before any fetch. The SSRF regression test was hardened to assert per-handler coverage (including the streaming handler) rather than a bare occurrence count, which previously let this gap pass.\n\n### Workarounds\n\n- Upgrade to the patched version (0.9.0).\n- Enable authentication and restrict who can reach the API (note: this does not constrain which URL the API fetches).\n- Restrict the container's outbound network access (egress firewall / no metadata route).\n\n### Credits\n\nKOH Jun Sheng - reported the streaming-path SSRF with a runnable PoC and noted the count-based regression test that masked it, plus the shared root cause with redirect/deep-crawl link following.\n\n## Affected packages\n\n- `crawl4ai < 0.9.0`\n\n## Remediation\n\nUpgrade to a patched release:\n\n- `crawl4ai 0.9.0`","depth":"twilight","depthScore":47,"depthScoreParts":{"impact":47.3,"likelihood":0.1,"exploitation":0,"ransomware":0},"changes":[]}