{"id":"CVE-2026-57571","aliases":["GHSA-2jq4-q6vv-4cp3"],"title":"Crawl4AI: Arbitrary file write (path traversal) in crawler downloads can lead to RCE","summary":"Crawl4AI: Arbitrary file write (path traversal) in crawler downloads can lead to RCE","severity":"critical","cvss":9.6,"cvssVector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","vendor":"crawl4ai","product":"crawl4ai","ecosystem":"pip","affected":["crawl4ai < 0.9.0"],"patched":["crawl4ai 0.9.0"],"published":"2026-06-18","updated":"2026-07-08","source":"OSV","sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-2jq4-q6vv-4cp3","references":[{"url":"https://github.com/unclecode/crawl4ai/security/advisories/GHSA-2jq4-q6vv-4cp3"},{"url":"https://github.com/unclecode/crawl4ai"}],"tags":["osv","pip"],"epss":0.00809,"epssPercentile":0.55369,"ingestedAt":"2026-07-08T18:25:44.540Z","slug":"CVE-2026-57571","body":"## Overview\n\n### Summary\n\nWhen the crawler saves a downloaded file, the destination filename was taken from attacker-influenced input and joined to the downloads directory with no confinement. A filename containing an absolute path (e.g. `/etc/cron.d/evil`) or `../` traversal escaped the downloads directory, giving an arbitrary file write with attacker-controlled contents. Because the written bytes are attacker-controlled, this escalates to remote code execution (overwriting a shell rc-file, `~/.ssh/authorized_keys`, a cron entry, or a Python module on the import path).\n\n### Affected paths\n\nTwo download sinks in `crawl4ai/async_crawler_strategy.py`:\n- HTTP crawler (`AsyncHTTPCrawlerStrategy`): the filename is parsed from the response `Content-Disposition` header by `_extract_filename()` and written via `aiofiles.open(filepath, 'wb')`. Reachable directly via the SDK, and via the unauthenticated Docker `/crawl` endpoint when an `HTTPCrawlerConfig` is supplied.\n- Browser crawler (`AsyncPlaywrightCrawlerStrategy`): the download's `suggested_filename` (controllable by the visited page) is joined to `downloads_path` and written via `download.save_as()`.\n\nThe HTTP-strategy sink is reachable pre-auth on the default Docker deployment; both are reachable for SDK users simply by crawling an attacker-controlled URL. The default Playwright crawl path that does not trigger a download is unaffected.\n\n### Impact\n\nArbitrary file write with attacker-controlled content as the user running the crawler, escalating to remote code execution.\n\n### Fix\n\nBoth sinks now resolve the destination through a single hardened helper (`_safe_download_filepath`) that reduces the attacker-influenced name to a bare basename (dropping absolute paths and `..` components) and re-checks, via `realpath`, that the resolved path stays inside the downloads root (defeating symlink/TOCTOU escapes). A traversal attempt is rejected; normal downloads are unchanged.\n\n### Workarounds\n\n- Upgrade to the patched version (0.9.0).\n- Run the crawler as an unprivileged user with a dedicated, isolated downloads directory on a volume with no sensitive paths writable.\n- Enable authentication (`CRAWL4AI_API_TOKEN`) on the Docker server.\n\n### Credits\n\nY4tacker - reported the Content-Disposition path traversal in the HTTP crawler with a clear PoC and a basename + realpath-containment fix recommendation.\n\n## Affected packages\n\n- `crawl4ai < 0.9.0`\n\n## Remediation\n\nUpgrade to a patched release:\n\n- `crawl4ai 0.9.0`","depth":"midnight","depthScore":53,"depthScoreParts":{"impact":52.8,"likelihood":0.2,"exploitation":0,"ransomware":0},"changes":[]}