{"id":"CVE-2026-48816","title":"sigstore-js has Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity","summary":"sigstore-js has Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity","severity":"medium","cvss":6.5,"cwe":["CWE-345"],"vendor":"sigstore","product":"@sigstore/verify","ecosystem":"npm","affected":["@sigstore/verify = 3.1.0"],"patched":["@sigstore/verify 3.1.1"],"published":"2026-07-01","updated":"2026-07-01","source":"GHSA","sourceUrl":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xgjw-pm74-86q4","references":[{"url":"https://github.com/sigstore/sigstore-js/security/advisories/GHSA-xgjw-pm74-86q4"},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xgjw-pm74-86q4"}],"tags":["ghsa","npm"],"ingestedAt":"2026-07-01T20:16:35.286Z","epss":0.00158,"epssPercentile":0.05328,"slug":"CVE-2026-48816","body":"## Overview\n\nsigstore-js derives a transparency-log timestamp from `tlogEntries[].integratedTime` and uses it to validate certificate validity windows and satisfy `timestampThreshold`. For bundle v0.2, a tlog entry can be inclusionProof-only (no signed inclusionPromise/set), and the inclusion proof path does not cryptographically bind `integratedTime`. As a result, an attacker who can supply an untrusted bundle can influence time-based verification decisions by choosing `integratedTime`.\n\n## impact\nIf a consumer accepts attacker-provided bundle v0.2 inputs and relies on tlog-derived timestamps for certificate validity checks, verification can be influenced by an unauthenticated timestamp value. This is a trust gap: `integratedTime` is treated as a trusted observer timestamp under inclusionProof-only mode even though only the signed inclusionPromise/set path binds it.\n\n## affected code\n- `packages/verify/src/bundle/index.ts` (adds a transparency-log timestamp whenever `integratedTime != 0`)\n- `packages/verify/src/timestamp/index.ts` (converts `integratedTime` to a `Date`)\n- `packages/verify/src/verifier.ts` (verifies timestamps before verifying tlog inclusion)\n- `packages/verify/src/tlog/index.ts` + `packages/verify/src/tlog/set.ts` (only the inclusionPromise/set path binds `integratedTime`)\n\n## proof of concept\nThe attached `poc.zip` contains a self-contained harness that reproduces the behavior on the pinned commit and includes both a canonical test and a negative control.\n\nrepro:\n1) extract `poc.zip` into a fresh directory and run the make targets:\n\n```bash\nunzip poc.zip -d poc\ncd poc/poc-F-SIG-JS-TLOGTIME-001\nmake canonical\nmake control\n```\n\n2) confirm `canonical.log` includes:\n\n```\n[CALLSITE_HIT]:\n[PROOF_MARKER]:\n```\n\n3) confirm `control.log` includes:\n\n```\n[NC_MARKER]:\n```\n\n## suggested fix\nOnly treat `integratedTime` as a trusted timestamp when it is cryptographically bound (for example, via a verified signed inclusionPromise/set). For inclusionProof-only entries, do not count `integratedTime` toward `timestampThreshold`, and do not use it for certificate validity decisions unless there is another signed time source (for example, an rfc3161 timestamp).\n\n[poc.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/25643656/poc.zip)\n[PR_DESCRIPTION.md](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/25643660/PR_DESCRIPTION.md)\n[SUBMISSION.md](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/25643662/SUBMISSION.md)\n\n## Affected packages\n\n- `@sigstore/verify = 3.1.0`\n\n## Remediation\n\nUpgrade to a patched release:\n\n- `@sigstore/verify 3.1.1`","depth":"sunlit","depthScore":36,"depthScoreParts":{"impact":35.8,"likelihood":0,"exploitation":0,"ransomware":0},"changes":[]}